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Article

Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION: RESOLVING THE "OLIGOPOLY
PROBLEM"
For more than 100 years, the courts and antitrust enforcement agencies have struggled unsuccessfully to regulate
the anticompetitive conduct of oligopolists. 1 In an oligopoly, a
small number of sellers controls most of the sales in the relevant market. 2 The structure of oligopoly markets facilitates
t Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Parker Hannifin
Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio. Distinguished Adjunct Lecturer, Case Western
University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974. The opinions expressed in this Article are personal to the author and do not reflect the opinions of Parker Hannifin Corporation.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 102-04 (1978).
2. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
192 (1985) ("When we have a small number of firms producing a homogeneous
output, the market structure is called an oligopoly."). There is no precise definition as to what market concentration levels create oligopoly power. See
ANTITRUST

POLICY

IN TRANSITION:

THE

CONVERGENCE

OF

LAW

AND

ECONOMICS 51 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1984) ("[T]here is
considerable doubt as to what degree of concentration is sufficiently great to
permit... tacit coordination."). Economists generally agree that a market
should be deemed oligopolistic when "the few largest sellers in the market
have a share of the market sufficient to make it likely that they will recognize
the interaction of their own behavior and their rivals' responses." CARL
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 27 (1959). Most economists
also agree on the outer limits of oligopoly power; that is, that oligopoly power
likely exists in markets with three or four major firms, but not in markets
with fifteen to twenty firms. Id. There is a "modest consensus" among economists that oligopoly power occurs when there are ten or fewer firms in the
relevant market. Id. Professor Phillip E. Areeda has noted that "[a]ll one can
say with assurance is that.., interdependence and price coordination are implausible when there are ...

more than a dozen ...

[rivals] but more likely as

the number of firms decreases." 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW
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anticompetitive conduct, diverting wealth from consumers to
producers. With so few sellers, oligopolists find it easier to coordinate their behavior to maintain prices above the normal
competitive level. 3 Such coordination often occurs tacitly, without any express agreement among the firms in the relevant
market. Oligopolists can anticipate with greater certainty how
their rivals are likely to react to a price increase. Simply by observing other firms' conduct, oligopolists can maintain prices at
high levels just as effectively as a monopolist or a group of
firms engaging in an express price-fixing conspiracy. As Professor Phillip Areeda has explained:
The simplest way to visualize the oligopoly possibility is an informal
cartel that comes about by implicit "bargaining" through market signals that result in a rough and unspoken coordination of prices....
The result can thus approximate the consequence of traditional pricefixing in a smoke-filled room, even though each firm does nothing but
make its own independent decision by observing what the other firms
4
do in the marketplace or say in the newspapers.

The courts have had no difficulty regulating express pricefixing agreements among competitors. Indeed, courts have uniformly condemned such "cartels" on their face without any inquiry into their actual economic effect. 5 If formal collusion were
not so clearly illegal, it would undoubtedly be the preferred
means for domestic oligopolists to achieve supracompetitive
prices. 6 Since express collusion is illegal on its face, however,
1431a, at 184 (1986).
3. See, e.g., ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 50
("Where the sellers are few in number, they will behave differently from firms
in markets with many sellers."). Roger Blair and David Kaserman have
pointed out that "[a]s long as no one gets too greedy, each firm can see that it
is better off with its fair share of the maximum industry profit than with a
proportional share of a much smaller profit." BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note
2, at 200.
4. ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 49-50.
5. See Dennis W. Carlton et al., Communication Among Competitors:
Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 425 (1997) ("The economic logic of the per se rule is that certain practices, such as the establishment among competitors of a 'naked' cartel, are so unlikely to be procompetitive that the judicial efficiency of immediate condemnation without any
detailed inquiry into the effects of the scheme outweighs the cost of banning
any 'efficient' or procompetitive cartels."); Susan S. DeSanti & Ernest A. Nagata, Competitor Communications:FacilitatingPracticesor Invitations To Collude?, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 103 (1994) ("[C]ompetitor communications that
result in a 'naked' agreement restricting price or output are per se unlawful
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act ...").
6. Express collusion "provides the greatest opportunity for exchange of
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there is a strong incentive for rivals to avoid such conduct. Instead, oligopolists can engage in informal means of communicating and enforcing a consensus price, such as by signaling
7
planned price increases in press releases or on the Internet.
The high levels of concentration in many U.S. markets today guarantee that tacit collusion will be a continuing problem.
The public accounting industry includes only four national
firms;8 four automobile companies produce approximately 75%

of the cars in the United States; 9 seven national carriers control
most domestic airline traffic; 10 Visa and MasterCard together
account for most of the transactions in the credit card market;' 1
four tobacco companies manufacture 97% of the cigarettes sold
in the United States; 12 and five pharmaceutical companies produce most of the nation's prescription drugs. 13
Since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, a debate
has raged over whether the antitrust laws can be construed to
preclude tacit collusion among oligopolists. The battle lines are
evident in the contrasting views of two of the most influential
antitrust intellectuals of the last century, Professor Donald
Turner and Judge Richard Posner. Professor Turner believes
information, resolution of disagreement, and communication of intentions."
George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 439, 453 (1982).
7. See infra notes 189-217 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure
techniques among oligopolists).
8. Floyd Norris, Will Auditing Reform Die Before it Begins?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2002, at Cl (referring to public accounting as "an oligopolistic industry").
9. John Porretto, GM Chairman Pulled Automaker From the Murk, THE
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER Apr. 20, 2003, at G5. The market shares for the top

four automobile firms are as follows: General Motors: 28%, Ford Motor Co.:
21%, Daimler Chrysler: 15%, Toyota Motor Sales: 10%. Id.
10. U.S. Industry Traffic Market Shares, 348 AVIATION DAILY 7 (May 20,
2002). The market shares of these carriers are as follows: American: 19%,
United: 17%, Delta: 15%, Northwest: 11%, Continental: 9%, Southwest: 7%,
US Airways: 7%. Id.
11. John R. Wilke, Visa, MasterCardCampaigned to Undercut Rival Debit
Cards,WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2002, at Al.
12. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1291
(11th Cir. 2003) ("The modern American tobacco industry is a classic oligopoly.").
13. See United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 367 F. Supp. 91, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (explaining that only five pharmaceutical companies sell tetracycline in
the United States). Many submarkets for particular drugs include only two or
three firms. See In re Pfizer, Inc. & Pharmacia Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
15,391, at 22,377-82 (May 30, 2003) (complaint and consent order) (describing several such submarkets).
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that oligopolists' coordinated conduct should not be illegal, 14
while Judge Posner argues that coordinated pricing by oligopo15
lists should be prohibited.
The split among antitrust commentators is reflected in the
federal courts, which have delivered a series of confused and
conflicting decisions on oligopoly conduct. 16 The courts' difficulty stems from the fact that the antitrust laws are not welldesigned to deal with oligopolists' tacit collusion. 17 Section 2 of
the Sherman Act prohibits monopolists from engaging in unilateral conduct that harms competition.18 Oligopoly conduct,
however, is covered by section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1
only precludes competitors from entering into a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."19 Thus, in order to be illegal, oligopolists' conduct must be based on an
agreement among the firms in the relevant market. This requirement has led the courts on an often fruitless search for a
formal "meeting of the minds" in oligopoly cases. While courts
have routinely condemned explicit price-fixing agreements on
their face, they have balked at finding an illegal agreement under section 1 when oligopolists have been able to achieve a consensus price simply by reacting to each other's conduct in the
20
marketplace.
Economically, there is no distinction between a meeting to
fix prices and "a situation in which two firms are sitting at
their computer terminals rapidly changing prices in response to
the others' actions." 21 Indeed, tacit coordinated conduct among

14. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV.
655, 671 (1962) ("I conclude, then, that oligopolists who take into account the
probable reactions of competitors in setting their basic prices, without more in
the way of 'agreement' than is found in 'conscious parallelism,' should not be
held unlawful conspirators under the Sherman Act .... ).
15. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969). Indeed, in his recent decision in In re
High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 661-65 (7th Cir.
2002), Posner reversed summary judgment using circumstantial evidence to
infer a possible illegal price-fixing agreement among suppliers of corn syrup.
16. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
17. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 221 ("[T]he antitrust laws
are not well equipped to deal with oligopoly.").
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661
(2004).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
20. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
21. Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 437.
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oligopolists may be more harmful to consumers than an overt
price-fixing cartel. Cartels are often undermined by cheating.
In those few cases where they do persist, cartels can be detected easily and punished by antitrust regulators. By contrast,
tacit coordination among a group of oligopolists is difficult to
discover, and such conduct is likely to be sustained for a longer
period. 22 Yet, according to many courts and commentators, the
Sherman Act would preclude the cartel and let the oligopolists
proceed with their tacit coordination. As a result, "some critics
maintain that the antitrust authorities are most successful
23
against those conspiracies that are least likely to succeed."
Commentators have referred to this gap in the antitrust laws
24
as the "oligopoly problem."
Ironically, the federal courts' dilemma in oligopoly cases
has been compounded by their increased use of economic analysis in recent years. This trend coincided with the appointment
of several influential Chicago School economists, including

See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 201. It could be argued that
merger enforcement under section 7 of the Clayton Act adequately deals with
22.
23.

the oligopoly problem. Section 7 proscribes mergers or acquisitions which may
"substantially... lessen competition, or... tend to create a monopoly." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2000). Section 7 was intended to prevent mergers or acquisitions
that would create concentrated markets in which it is easier for firms to coordinate anticompetitive conduct. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1 (1992), reprinted in 4 Tr. Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104 [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES] ("A merger may diminish compe-

tition by enabling firms... to engage in coordinated interaction that harms
consumers."); see also Joseph Kattan & William R. Vigdor, Game Theory and
the Analysis of Collusion in Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 441, 442 (1997) ("[A]nalysis [under section 7 of the Clayton Act] often focuses on whether post-merger market conditions are likely to enable firms to
coordinate their pricing and output decisions without engaging in any explicit
behavior that can be subjected to the sanctions of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act."). Section 7, however, can "contribute only marginally to solving the oligopoly problem." John E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's
Try, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 843, 905 (1996). It has no effect on existing oligopolies nor on those obtained by means other than acquisition, such as by internal
expansion or the exit of firms from the relevant market. Thus, if they want to
confront the problems of incumbent oligopolies, the courts will have to look to
section 1 and to its requirement for a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
24. See, e.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 193 ("[N]oncompetitive
price-quantity solutions may emerge without any overt conspiracy. For antitrust purposes, this is the oligopoly problem."); see also Lopatka, supra note
23, at 848 (identifying the "most troublesome case" as "oligopoly pricing," or
the consciously parallel decisions of a few dominant sellers in an industry to
maintain the same high noncompetitive price) (quoting Turner, supra note 14,
at 656).
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Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner, to the
federal bench in the 1970s. 25 During the last three decades,

most federal courts have concluded that economic efficiency
should be the sole goal of antitrust enforcement 26 and that antitrust regulators should refrain from intervening in markets
unless it is clear that firms have exercised their market power
to raise prices, restrict output, limit innovation, or otherwise
27
harm consumers.
While the Chicago School approach has protected many
beneficial forms of competition, it has also given oligopolists
free rein to engage in tacit price-fixing arrangements harmful
to consumers. For example, the lower federal courts have interpreted two recent Supreme Court decisions to preclude fact
finders from inferring a price-fixing conspiracy from circumstantial evidence. Since circumstantial evidence is usually the
only evidence available when oligopolists engage in tacit pricefixing arrangements, 28 this approach has left such conduct
completely unregulated.
This Article proposes a new approach that will preclude
oligopolists' tacit collusion while protecting their right to engage in aggressive independent competition. The approach recognizes that the purpose of oligopolists' conduct can be an effective proxy for the effect of such conduct upon consumers.
Indeed, prior to the advent of the Chicago School, the Supreme
Court had sanctioned a purpose-based approach to oligopolists'

25. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1985) (Easterbrook, J.); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d
742 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
26. Adherents to the Chicago School argue that antitrust enforcement
should be concerned only with protecting consumers from the overcharging
that can occur when firms gain an amount of market power that allows them
to artificially restrain output. Thus, antitrust policy need not consider social
goals unrelated to such abuses of market power, such as the protection of
small businesses or the fairness of the competitive process. See Robert H.
Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 24
(1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1696, 1703 (1986); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, AntitrustRetrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 945 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 917, 917 (1987) (explaining the Chicago School conclusion that the
greatest economic good comes from "the natural tendency of firms... to be efficient").
28. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
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29

competitive conduct.
In oligopoly cases, the courts should concentrate on
whether defendants have acted in a manner consistent with
their independent self-interest, or whether their conduct only
makes sense as a means of furthering a tacit agreement to
raise prices. It should not be difficult for courts to identify conduct that is contrary to a firm's independent self-interest.
Firms act against such self-interest when they disclose confidential pricing information, sacrifice their individual bargaining power to observe standard industry-wide terms of sale, or
forego otherwise attainable profits by following their competitors' price increases during periods of overcapacity or declining
demand. 30 Under normal circumstances, oligopolists would not
be willing to incur the losses associated with such conduct.
Courts can assume that firms are only willing to suffer such
losses because the firms have received implicit assurances from
their rivals that they will be compensated by the higher longterm profits resulting from a price-fixing arrangement. Such
tacit collusion should be illegal on its face, because it harms
consumers without any offsetting economic benefit.
Part II of this Article describes the evolution of oligopoly
theory during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, relying on game theory, explains why oligopolists are more likely to
engage in tacit collusion than firms in less concentrated markets. Part III describes the federal courts' failure to establish
an effective means of regulating tacit collusion among oligopolists. Part IV sets forth a proposed means of analyzing oligopolists' tacit collusion under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part V
describes how independent parallel conduct would be dealt
with under the proposed approach. Part VI reconciles the proposed approach with relevant precedent from the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts. Part VII applies the proposed
approach to the primary types of tacit collusion, and Part VIII
sets forth the remedies against such conduct that would be
available under the proposed approach.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF OLIGOPOLY THEORY
A. How OLIGOPOLIES HARM CONSUMERS
In the last several decades, a consensus has begun to
29.

See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.

30.

See infra notes 193-238 and accompanying text.
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emerge among economists and antitrust commentators on how
oligopolists' tacit collusion harms consumers. This consensus
could form the foundation for a new approach to the antitrust
regulation of such conduct.
In a perfectly competitive market, with many competing
firms and easy terms of entry and exit, firms must price at the
market level (i.e., at marginal cost) or risk losing sales to competitors. However, in an oligopoly, where there are only a few
sellers, it is easier for those sellers to cooperate to raise prices
above the normal competitive level. Coordination among oligopolists can allow sellers to price above marginal cost at "supracompetitive" prices. 3 1 Economists believe that such prices
have two significant adverse effects. First, they harm consumers by transferring wealth from purchasers to producers. 32 Second, they may cause purchasers to forego buying a product entirely. As a result, consumers suffer a loss which is not offset by
any gain to sellers. 33 Economists describe this phenomenon as a
34
"dead weight loss."
In the past, some commentators argued that oligopolists
are just as likely as firms in less concentrated markets to price
at a competitive level. In 1883, Joseph Bertrand concluded
that, even in a two-firm market, the sellers would achieve equilibrium at the competitive price (i.e., a price equal to marginal
costs), because if either firm priced above marginal cost, it
would lose the entire market to its rival. 35 Some economic stud-

31. Lopatka, supra note 23, at 847-48 n.11.
32. Recently, however, some commentators have argued that the potential
for worldwide deflation now constitutes a more significant threat to consumers
than inflation and that governments around the world should not devote their
resources to prosecute price-fixing. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Want
More Deflation? Let's Go Hunting Cartels, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2003, at All
(wondering "if, in a world tilting toward deflation, an all-out hunt for cartels
right now is the most productive use of government energy").
33. As Judge Posner has explained,
When market price rises above the competitive level, consumers who
continue to purchase the seller's product at the new, higher price suffer a loss ... exactly offset by the additional revenue that the sellers
obtain at the higher price. Those who stop buying the product suffer a
loss ... not offset by any gain to the sellers. [The latter] is the "deadweight loss" from supracompetitive pricing and in traditional analysis
its only social cost, [the former] being regarded merely as a transfer
from consumers to producers.
Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 807 (1975).
34. ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMIcs 239 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1980).
35. See J. Bertrand, Thorie des Richesses, 67 J. DES SAVANTS 499, 503

2004]

REGULATING OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT

17

ies conducted in the mid-twentieth century showed no correlation between increased levels of concentration and higher
prices. In reviewing these studies, Yale Brozen "was surprised
to find no persistence over time in the correlation between concentration and profitability." 36 Similarly, Robert Bork concluded that "[t]he available evidence strongly suggests that oligopolies do not generally result in substantial or significant
37
restrictions of output."

The weight of economic theory, however, now supports the
conclusion that oligopolies do facilitate supracompetitive pricing. In 1838, Augustin Cournot published one of the first theses
on oligopolistic behavior. 38 In his model, two theoretical oligopolists calculate their output so that, together, they will be able to
achieve a profit-maximizing price approaching the monopoly
level. 39 Many twentieth century economists have come to a

similar conclusion. Edward Chamberlin argued in 1960 that
sellers in a concentrated market will independently price at the
monopoly level. 40 Chamberlin concluded, "[s]ince the result of a
cut by any one is inevitably to decrease his own profits, no one
will cut, and, although the sellers are entirely independent, the
equilibrium result is the same as though there were a monopolistic agreement between them." 41 Several economic studies in

the late twentieth century concluded that higher market concentration levels are associated with enhanced profits and increased prices. 42 By the end of the century, a consensus had
(1883) (reviewing AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RECHERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPES
MATHEMATIQUES DE LA THtORIE DES RICHESSES (Paris, 1838)).

36. Yale Brozen, The Concentration-CollusionDoctrine, 46 ANTITRUST L.J.
826, 843 (1978).

37.

BORK, supra note 1, at 180.

38.

AUGUSTIN

COURNOT,

RESEARCHES

INTO

THE

MATHEMATICAL

PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., London,
MacMillan 1897) (1838).

39.

See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 862.

40. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION: A REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 46-51 (7th ed.
1960).
41. Id. at 48.
42. See BORK, supra note 1, at 180 (citing WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON
ANTITRUST POLICY REPORT, reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11

(1968)) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT], which found "a close association
between high levels of concentration and persistently high rates of return on
capital, particularly in those industries in which the largest four firms account
for more than 60% of sales"; ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 34,
at 241-42 (referring to forty-six studies showing a positive "relationship between concentration and profits or price-cost margins"); id. at 245 (describing
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evolved that firms in highly concentrated markets are less
likely to engage in aggressive price competition. 43
B. GAME THEORY EXPLANATIONS FOR TACIT COLLUSION

Recent models of game theory explain why oligopolists are
able to maintain a price equilibrium at a level above that which
would prevail in a perfectly competitive market (i.e., above
marginal cost). 44 Game theory has been described as "a rich,

comprehensive and organized representation of economic interactions that emphasizes the timing of actors' decisions and the
information they have when they act."4 5 In 1950, Nobel prize-

winning mathematician John Nash posited what later became
known as the "Nash equilibrium," based on an analysis of social
and economic behavior as a multiparty game involving a mix of
cooperation and competition. Nash emphasized that "interdependence is the distinguishing feature of games of strategy, 46
in that "[t]he outcome of a game for one player depends on what
all the other players choose to do and vice versa." 47 Players pick

their response to another player's moves based on what they
perceive as the best choice for them when all others are using
their best strategies. In certain cases, players will choose to cooperate rather than to compete, because they will conclude that
they have more to gain from committing themselves to a collective strategy with their rivals. 48
Game theory explains how oligopolists can maintain supracompetitive prices without entering into express price-fixing
agreements. In an oligopoly, where there are so few firms in the
relevant market, it is easier for firms to make pricing decisions
studies of cost of "grocery baskets" demonstrating that "concentration and
relative market share had highly significant positive effects on price").
43. "American industries that ride with the economic cycle often go
through waves of consolidation during times of bust, sometimes whittling
down to a handful of big competitors. That gives the survivors power to raise
prices and reap greater profits." Edward Wong, Bigger Portions of Pie in the
Sky, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, at WK6. For example, the U.S. airline industry, with six dominant national carriers, was not motivated to provide lower
fares until low-cost airlines such as Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and
AirTran Airways entered the market. Id.
44. For a summary of game theory concepts, see generally Jonathan B.
Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: ParallelPricing, the Oligopoly
Problemand ContemporaryEconomic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1993).
45. Lopatka, supra note 23, at 890.
46.

SYLvIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND 97 (1998).

47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 96.
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"in reference to the likely reaction of competitors." 49 Each firm
recognizes its interdependence with other firms in the market
and understands that "its optimal price is a function of the
price charged by its rivals." 50 An oligopolist is aware that "its
rivals are as strongly armed as it is with weapons of price reductions, aggressive advertising, and product improvement." 51
Thus each firm will want to avoid prompting aggressive competitive responses from its rivals. If one firm cuts prices in an
effort to boost sales, rivals may be compelled to match the price
cut, not only rendering the initial effort to secure additional
volume unsuccessful, but making all firms worse off than before.5 2 Would-be price cutters, therefore, will resist the temptation to lower their prices and will adhere to the consensus
price. Achieving such a consensus is facilitated by the information legitimately available in the marketplace. When only a few
sellers must act on the information, it is easier for them to anticipate each other's reactions.
Consider a small town with two gasoline stations located
directly across the street from each other. Since each station
posts its prices, its rival will become immediately aware of any
price change. Neither station will have an incentive to cut its
price below the consensus level. Each station owner will realize
that it cannot steal customers from its rival with a lower price
before its rival can respond by reducing its own prices. As a result, each station should anticipate an immediate matching of
its lower price, and neither station will have an incentive to initiate a price decrease. "Cooperative pricing is thus a logical outcome of the 'game' without any secret meetings or additional
53
communication."
Game theory also explains how oligopolists can increase
prices in a coordinated manner without entering into an explicit price-fixing arrangement. Oligopolists have nothing to
lose, and much to gain, by signaling to each other their desire
49. Robert A. Milne & Jack E. Pace, III, The Scope of Expert Testimony on
the Subject of Conspiraciesin a Sherman Act Case, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003,
at 36, 37.
50. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 200; see also Bailey v. Allgas,
Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The distinctive characteristic of
oligopoly is recognized interdependence among the leading firms: the profitmaximizing choice of price and output for one depends on the choices made by
others.").
51. BORK, supra note 1, at 188.
52. Hay, supra note 6, at 444.
53. Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 428.
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for a price increase. If one firm believes that prices in the relevant market are not at the maximum possible level, it will announce a price increase scheduled to become effective at a future date. If other firms do not follow, the leader can simply
retract the price increase before its effective date. On the other
hand, if other competitors in the market follow the leader and
announce similar price increases, all the firms can be confident
that they will participate in a share of the higher profits that
will result from the price increase.
C. PROSECUTORIAL THEORIES OF COORDINATED INTERACTION
Recent theories adopted by government regulators illustrate how oligopolists are able to police adherence to the terms
of a tacit price-fixing arrangement. Government regulators
have used a model called "coordinated interaction" to assess the
likelihood for tacit collusion in oligopoly markets. Coordinated
interaction describes the means by which firms in concentrated
markets are able to increase prices without having to enter into
an express agreement. In a landmark 1964 article, George Stigler, a Nobel prize-winning economist who has been called the
"father of modern oligopoly theory,"5 4 identified three elements
of successful coordinated interaction: (1) reaching agreement on
the terms of coordination, (2) detecting deviations from the
agreed terms, and (3) punishing firms that deviate from the
agreed terms. 55 All of these conditions are easier to achieve in
oligopoly markets, because there are fewer rivals that must
sign on to a common approach. 56 The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have used Stigler's theories as a tool to determine
whether to prosecute particular mergers. The current Merger
Guidelines of the DOJ and FTC provide that mergers which
substantially increase concentration levels in the relevant
market should be precluded because they create market condi-

54. William J. Kolasky, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From
Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks, Presentation Before the
ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting (Apr. 24, 2002), at 5, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l11050.htm.
55. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 45-48
(1964).
56. ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 240
("[C]oncentration will facilitate collusion, whether tacit or explicit."); BLAIR &
KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 192 ("Small numbers of firms are much more conducive to collusion than large numbers.").

2004]

REGULATING OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT

21

57
tions which facilitate coordinated interaction.
Both Stigler and the Merger Guidelines recognize that
cheating on a price-fixing arrangement is attractive to individual firms, because it can bring an immediate windfall of new
business to the cheater. Thus, if a tacit price-fixing arrangement is to be successful, it must include some provision for po58
licing and enforcing adherence to the consensus price. Oligopolists can informally agree to implement practices that
reduce any uncertainty as to whether all firms in the market
will adhere to the terms of a tacit price-fixing agreement. Firms
will be more likely to adhere to a consensus price when they
know that any price decreases can be easily detected. For example, by reporting otherwise confidential pricing information
to each other, oligopolists can deter their rivals from deviating
from the consensus price. As Judge Posner explained in his recent decision in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup (hereinafter
HFCS), "if one seller broke ranks, the others would quickly discover the fact, and so the seller would have gained little from
cheating on his coconspirators; the threat of such discovery
59
tends to shore up a cartel."

D. THE CURRENT CONSENSUS ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF
EXPRESS AND TACIT COLLUSION

George Hay has explained that "[t]he prototype... [of an
explicit cartel] is the smoke-filled room in which all the rivals
engage in face-to-face communication." 60 In a cartel, competitors expressly agree to coordinate their prices without integrating their resources in any manner. 61 Since the parties have not
pooled their resources or contributed any assets to the arrangement, a cartel has neither the objective nor the possibility
of generating any procompetitive effects, such as the elimination of redundant costs or synergies from the combination of

57.
58.

MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1, supra note 23.
Stigler, supra note 55, at 44; MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1, supra note

23.
59. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656
(7th Cir. 2002).
60. Hay, supra note 6, at 452.
61. See Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 712 (1998) ("If two competitors formed a venture

that did nothing but set their prices, the arrangement would be nothing more
than a price-fixing cartel, and it would be treated as such under the antitrust

laws.").
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complementary resources. 62 Indeed, the only effects of a cartel
are anticompetitive. Explicit agreements allow the participants
to bargain openly on a consensus industry price level and to
communicate to each other their intention to adhere to the consensus price. Such agreements also allow the participants to establish mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing adherence to
the consensus price. 63 Express cartels constitute brazen attempts to manipulate prices for the participants' benefit, and
they cause substantial harm to consumers. Since their adverse
effects are not justified by any offsetting efficiency benefits, the
courts have condemned explicit price-fixing agreements on
their face without any further inquiry into the motives of the
64
defendants or their actual economic effect.
There is now a consensus among economists that tacit
price-fixing arrangements are just as harmful to consumers as
explicit price-fixing agreements. 6 5 Commentators have concluded that, since "there is no vital difference between formal

62. Such ventures "offer no significant prospect of consumer benefit." Id.;
see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New
Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1788-89
(1994) (stating that, when competitors simply coordinate their efforts without
integrating their resources, the "arrangement is incapable of producing efficiencies" and therefore, "the mere coordination of parallel activity without any
corresponding integration amounts to no more than a naked restraint of
trade").
63. See Werden, supra note 61, at 712.
64. Oral agreements by competitors to set prices are no less pernicious
than explicit cartels. It should make no difference whether the participants
agree in writing to fix prices or whether they simply give their oral assent to
such an arrangement. Like explicit agreements, oral arrangements give all the
participants confidence that the consensus price will be observed and that
cheaters will be detected and punished. A court will have to inquire further to
confirm the existence of an oral price-fixing agreement. Fact finders will have
to rely on the testimony of witnesses who participated in or observed the negotiation of the relevant agreement. Such testimony, however, will often be dispositive on the conspiracy issue. A witness may, for example, have heard a defendant offer an oral "quid pro quo" for certain conduct. In In re YKK (U.S.A.)
Inc., 116 FTC LEXIS 628 (1993), the FTC found a conspiracy when the defendant stated to a competitor that it would refrain from offering free equipment
to its customers if the competitor did likewise. Id. European antitrust authorities are currently investigating a possible price-fixing agreement between two
ocean-shipping firms. Among the potential evidence against the two firms are
statements by executives concerning their oral agreement to "carve[ ] up the
world." James Bandler, How Seagoing Chemical Haulers May Have Tried To
Divide Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at Al.
65. See, e.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 205-06 ("Section 1 attacks collusion because it is a joint effort to reap monopoly profits, and tacit
collusion has a very similar impact.").
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the tacit colluder

should be punished like the express colluder." 66 Firms engaged
in tacit collusion can duplicate the conditions that occur under
an explicit cartel. Like an express agreement, a tacit arrangement involves the reaching of a consensus on an above-market
price and the adoption of a means of enforcing adherence to
that consensus. With greater assurance of their rivals' acquiescence, oligopolists gain the confidence necessary to persist in
67
pricing levels above the competitive norm.
Tacit collusion, like express price-fixing, should be illegal
on its face under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The courts need
not inquire into the specific economic effects of such conduct,
because it harms consumers without offering the possibility of
any efficiency benefits. 68 However, despite economists' recognition of the similar effects of express and tacit price-fixing, the
courts continue to treat tacit collusion more leniently than express price-fixing. In fact, in its most recent cases, the Supreme
Court has adopted an approach that would let oligopolists engage in tacit collusion with impunity.

66. Id.; see also DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 5, at 121 ("Under the facilitating practices theory, the communication or exchange of information...
might lead ... to the same results the parties sought to achieve through their
proposed formal agreement."). As Professor Areeda has argued, "One may reluctantly tolerate interdependent pricing behavior as such and still condemn
[those agreements involving] practices which unjustifiably facilitate interdependent pricing and which can be readily identified and enjoined." PHILLIP
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
325, at 381 (3d ed. 1981); see also DeSanti &
Nagata, supra note 5, at 95 ('There appears to be no inherent reason why...
[tacit collusion] should not be sanctioned if it is likely to lead to competitive
harm.").
67. See Hay, supra note 6, at 446-47 (stating that firms engaged in tacit
coordination can gain a mutual understanding of the consensus industry price
and a mutual sense of confidence that all firms will adhere to that price).
68. John Lopatka has argued that "supracompetitive pricing by oligopolists cannot persist absent impediments to entry and exit" and that, consequently, such market factors should be considered before oligopoly pricing is
deemed illegal. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 903. However, although new
entrants can ultimately cause oligopolists to reduce their prices, the per se illegality of oligopoly conduct is justified by the deterrent effect of such an approach and by the fact that consumers can be harmed substantially before a
new entrant can have an impact in the relevant market. Indeed, for such reasons, the courts have never accepted the argument that ease of entry and
other similar market factors can be used to justify naked price-fixing agreements. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) ('Ve have
never required proof of market power in such a case.").

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:9

III. THE COURTS' INABILITY TO REGULATE
OLIGOPOLISTS' TACIT COLLUSION
Despite more than a century of litigation under the
Sherman Act and the ability to draw on almost two centuries of
economic theory, the federal courts have been unable to develop
an effective means of regulating oligopolists' tacit collusion.
Their dilemma stems from an undue concentration on the section 1 conspiracy requirement. This obsession with the conspiracy issue has diverted the courts' attention from the effect of
oligopolies on consumers. Instead of considering whether oligopolists have successfully coordinated their behavior to raise
prices above the normal competitive level, the courts have engaged in an extended search for various "plus factors" necessary to prove the existence of a formal agreement among the
defendants. Yet the courts' search for a "meeting of the minds"
in oligopoly pricing cases is destined to be fruitless. Stigler has
pointed out that there is no connection between the legal concept of conspiracy and "the workings of real markets." 69 Indeed,
Stigler concluded that "[t]here is no established economic content to words such as 'collusion', 'conspiracy', or 'concerted action'." 70 Similarly, Herbert Hovenkamp has opined that
"economists typically don't care whether firms have 'agreed' in
the legal sense of the term."71 Nevertheless, in many section 1

cases, the courts have made the conspiracy inquiry their highest priority. As a result, the courts have rendered a conflicting
series of opinions that have only served to confuse business executives as to the dividing line between permissible and illegal
oligopoly conduct.
A. THE FRUITLESS SEARCH FOR PLUS FACTORS

Courts and commentators have been nearly unanimous in
their conclusion that oligopolists should not be liable under the
antitrust laws for engaging in "conscious parallelism": i.e., for
independently determining their own prices with a full understanding that their rivals are likely to follow suit.7 2 When an

69. George J. Stigler, What Does an Economist Know?, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
311, 312 (1983).
70. Id.
71. Herbert Hovenkamp, Economic Experts in Antitrust Cases, in DAVID
L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 38-2.0, at 179 (1999),
quoted in Milne & Pace, supra note 49, at 38.
72. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1299
(11th Cir. 2003) ("When they are a product of a rational, independent calculus
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oligopolist simply takes its rivals' likely reactions into account,
it is merely recognizing its interdependence with other firms,
and not even the most expanded definitions of "agreement"
have been deemed to encompass such conduct. 73 A 1962 Harvard Law Review article by Professor Donald Turner helped to
establish the principle that consciously parallel conduct does
not violate section 1.74 Professor Turner argued that "identical
but unrelated responses by a group of similarly situated competitors to the same set of economic facts

. . .

is not 'agreement'

by any stretch of the imagination."75 Professor Turner's analyby each member of the oligopoly, as opposed to collusion, these types of synchronous actions have become known as 'conscious parallelism."'). In no case
has consciously parallel conduct been deemed sufficient in and of itself to establish a section 1 conspiracy. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 208
("There are no cases in which mere parallel behavior was found by the courts
to constitute collusion."). The Supreme Court has emphasized in several cases
that such conduct cannot be illegal under section 1. For example, in Theatre
Enterprises v. ParamountFilm Distributors,the Court stated that:
[T]his Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior
conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such
behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads
into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious
parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) ("Tacit collusion .... sometimes called
'conscious parallelism,'... [is] not in itself unlawful .... ); United States v.
Int'l Harvester, 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927) ("[T]he fact that competitors may
see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of competition or show
any sinister domination."). The lower federal courts have been no less consistent in upholding parallel pricing. See, e.g., Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[P]laintiffs must come forward
with some significant probative evidence which suggests that conscious parallelism is the result of an unlawful agreement."); United States v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 367 F. Supp. 91, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[Parallel pricing.., standing
alone, does not indicate price fixing.").
73. Economist Edward Chamberlin has stated that, in an oligopoly, each
seller "is forced by the situation itself to take into account the policy of his rival in determining his own, and this cannot be construed as a 'tacit agreement'
between the two." CHAMBERLIN, supra note 40, at 31, quoted in Lopatka, supra note 23, at 849 n.17. Judge Breyer has explained that interdependent pricing by oligopolists, without more, does not violate section 1: "Courts... have
almost uniformly held.., that.., individual pricing decisions (even when
each firm rests its own decision upon its belief that competitors will do the
same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under section 1 of the
Sherman Act." Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484
(1st Cir. 1988).
74. See Turner, supra note 14, at 655.
75. Id. at 658.
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sis became a "bedrock principle, launching in subsequent cases
innumerable searches for something more than simple parallelism, for 'plus factors' that would transform the defendants' con76
duct into an actionable conspiracy."
Unfortunately, the courts have found it difficult to define
the plus factors that distinguish legitimate independent action
from unlawful concerted conduct. 77 One commentator has
pointed out that "[t]hese efforts have been largely unsuccessful,
producing a confused series of opinions that provide little guidance on when antitrust liability will be found."7 8 Moreover, the
courts have been too demanding in their analysis of plus factors, placing burdens on plaintiffs that preclude a finding of
conspiracy in cases where the presence of tacit collusion should
have been clear. For example, in In re Ethyl Corp., the FTC
properly found the requisite factors in a number of practices
that facilitated coordinated pricing among four manufacturers
of lead-based antiknock compounds. 79 The Second Circuit, however, reversed the FTC's decision, finding that the manufactur80
ers had independently adopted the facilitating practices.
United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co. also illustrates the courts'
reluctance to infer the requisite plus factors for a finding of
conspiracy.8 1 The Government alleged that five pharmaceutical
companies conspired to fix prices and exclude competitors from
the antibiotic market. There was considerable evidence that the
defendants effected their conspiracy through a series of patent
licenses which prevented other firms from entering the market.
There was also evidence that the defendants had maintained

76. Lopatka, supra note 23, at 845; see also Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip
Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) ("We have fashioned a test
under which price-fixing plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of 'plus factors' that remove their evidence from the realm of equipoise and render that
evidence more probative of conspiracy than of conscious parallelism.").
77. John Lopatka has posed the oligopoly dilemma as follows: "Section 1
could not be used to punish ... [oligopolists] simply for pricing interdependently, but.., they usually will have done more and could then be attacked
under section 1. The devil is in deciding whether they did enough more." Lopatka, supra note 23, at 907.
78. Hay, supra note 6, at 465; see also Lopatka, supra note 23, at 898
("Given the unsettled state of theory, courts not surprisingly struggle when
deciding what conduct is enough 'more' to warrant liability.").
79. 101 F.T.C. 425, 481-84 (1983), vacated sub nom. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
80. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 729 F.2d at 141-42.
81. 367 F. Supp. 91, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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substantially similar prices for antibiotics.8 2 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the defendants had engaged
in nothing
83
more than permissible conscious parallelism.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE
CONSPIRACY STANDARD
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court recognized the need to
clarify the standards for inferring the existence of an illegal
section 1 conspiracy, and it granted certiorari in two cases in
which defendants' liability depended upon whether a conspiracy could be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the Court's approach in those cases only served to confuse the conspiracy issue further.
The Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp.8 4 erected a high hurdle for section 1
plaintiffs. The plaintiff, a former Monsanto distributor, alleged
that Monsanto had conspired with other distributors to effect
its termination to enforce a resale price-fixing conspiracy. Monsanto had terminated the distributor after receiving complaints
from other distributors about its price-cutting practices. The
Court decided that it could not infer a conspiracy merely from
the fact that Monsanto had received such complaints. Permitting such an inference could preclude manufacturers from exercising their right to terminate distributors for legitimate independent reasons. The Court concluded:
Thus, something more than evidence of complaints is needed. There
must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently.... [T]he antitrust plaintiff should present... evidence that
reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others "had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
85
unlawful objective."

Despite this high burden of proof, the Court confused the
issue when it proceeded to hold that the terminated distributor
had, in fact, presented sufficient evidence of a resale pricefixing conspiracy to survive summary judgment. The Court relied on testimony (1) that Monsanto had threatened other pricecutting distributors that it would reduce their supplies of Mon-

82. Id.
83. Id. at 101.
84. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
85. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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santo's new corn herbicide, and (2) that the distributors had informed Monsanto that they would charge its suggested resale
price.86

In 1986, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. u. Zenith
Radio Corp.,8 7 the Supreme Court elaborated upon its rationale
for creating a substantial burden of proof for section 1 plaintiffs. The plaintiff in Matsushita alleged that Japanese television manufacturers had conspired to drive American firms from
the U.S. market by fixing artificially high prices for their television sets in Japan and artificially low prices for such sets in
America. The Court pointed out that the Japanese companies
had no rational business motive for entering into such a conspiracy, because the low prices in the U.S. market would "generate losses ... with no corresponding gains."8 8 The Court
stated that since the plaintiffs' claim made "no economic sense,"
they would have to "come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."8 9 Quoting Monsanto, the Court concluded that the plain-

tiffs had not presented "sufficiently unambiguous evidence...
that tends to exclude the possibility" that the defendants were
acting lawfully. 90
The Supreme Court's Monsanto/Matsushita standard has
proven unworkable for lower federal courts attempting to identify price-fixing conspiracies. There are no clear guidelines by
which fact finders can determine how to exclude the possibility
that a defendant had a legitimate independent purpose for its
conduct. Lower federal courts have decided simply to grant
summary judgment to defendants when the evidence of conspiracy is evenly balanced, or is ambiguous. 9 1 For example, in
Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., the court affirmed a
summary judgment in the defendants' favor, despite evidence
of communications among the defendants that were "ambiguous on the question of whether the producers schemed to set
86. Id. at 765.
87. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

88. Id. at 595.
89. Id. at 587.
90. Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
91. See, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that plaintiff must prove evidence beyond that which is merely
"compatible with the legitimate business activities of the defendant"); Re/Max
Int'l v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[C]ircumstantial
evidence alone cannot support a finding of conspiracy when the evidence is
equally consistent with independent conduct.").
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prices." 92 Thus, under the prevailing interpretation of the Mon-

santo/Matsushitastandard, a plaintiff will not be able to get to
a jury in a section 1 case unless it can introduce direct and uncontradicted evidence of an agreement among the defendants.
The lower federal courts' interpretation of Monsanto and
Matsushita flies in the face of the Supreme Court's historical
willingness to infer the existence of a horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy from circumstantial evidence. 93 In Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers Association v. United States, the Court
inferred an illegal conspiracy from lumber retailers' circulation
of reports naming wholesalers that sold directly to the retailers'
customers. 94 The Court noted that "[ilt is elementary... that
conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony
and may be inferred from the things actually done ... ."95 Similarly, in its 1969 decision in United States v. Container Corp.,
the Court inferred an illegal agreement from the mere exchange of pricing information among competing sellers of cor96
rugated containers.
C. APPLYING THE MONSANTO/MATSUSHITA STANDARD TO
OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT

The Monsanto/Matsushita approach places oligopoly regulation on its head. It applies the strictest standard to agreements which are least harmful to consumers and reserves the
most lenient treatment for the most harmful types of arrangements. The courts have made it clear that cartels and other ex92.

203 F.3d 1028, 1035, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000); see also In re Citric Acid

Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment

despite several ambiguous statements, including a "smoking gun" document
that could also be "construed in a benign light"); In re Baby Food Antitrust
Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (allowing summary judgment despite
internal documents describing a "truce" among industry participants).
93. A "horizontal" price-fixing conspiracy occurs among firms operating at
the same competitive level, while a "vertical" conspiracy occurs among firms at
different competitive levels, such as a supplier and its customers. See Bus.
Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters.,
Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 556 (8th Cir. 1991).
94. 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
95. Id.
96. 393 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1969). Prior to Monsanto and Matsushita, the
lower federal courts were also willing to infer section 1 conspiracies from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 367 F.
Supp. 91, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence need not preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to support a conviction ....
").
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plicit price-fixing agreements should be per se illegal. 97 Explicit
price-fixing agreements, however, are usually not durable:
"Changing market conditions and the temptation to 'cheat' frequently result in outbreaks of price competition that either destroy the cartel or must be repaired by further meetings and
agreements."9 8 Thus, if a cartel does not fall of its own accord, it
usually must be sustained by overt conduct that is easy to detect and to punish.
By contrast, oligopolists' tacit collusion is both more durable and more difficult to discover than an explicit price-fixing
cartel. Because tacit price-fixing arrangements spring from the
very nature of oligopolistic markets, they are likely to persist
for long periods of time. Game theory suggests that oligopolists
will naturally gravitate toward an implicit consensus price. 99
Since the price achieved under a tacit understanding is the result not of explicit bargaining (in which there is give and take
and not all firms agree completely with the final price), but of
each firm's own decision about the price that is best for it, firms
will be less inclined to cheat on a tacit price-fixing arrangement. In a concentrated market, firms are more likely to continue to adhere to a consensus price because it is easier for
them to gain confidence in their rivals' willingness to support
such a price.
Not only is tacit collusion more durable than express collusion, it is also more difficult to detect and to prosecute. In most
oligopoly markets, tacit collusion occurs without meetings,
telephone calls, or any other direct contact or communications
among the participants.1 0 0 No witnesses will be able to testify
that they observed competitors negotiating an industry-wide
price. Oligopolists' implicit price-fixing arrangements can be
enforced by subtle signals communicated indirectly in press releases, on Web sites, or in individual firms' responses to their
rivals' competitive conduct. Thus, in nearly every case of tacit
price-fixing, the only evidence of conspiracy will be indirect and
ambiguous. However, when courts follow the strict interpreta-

97. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 15051 (1940) (holding price-fixing agreements to be unlawful per se without specific evidence of anticompetitive effects).
98. BORK, supra note 1, at 183.
99. See supranotes 44-53 and accompanying text.
100.

See

RICHARD

A.

POSNER,

ANTITRUST

LAW:

AN

ECONOMIC

PERSPECTIVE 71 (1996) (pointing out that oligopolists are more likely to collude without any express communication).
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tion of Monsanto and Matsushita that has prevailed in most
federal cases, no plaintiff will be able to reach a jury on the basis of such circumstantial evidence. This approach would leave
consumers without any remedy against tacit collusion, the most
harmful of all oligopoly conduct. As Judge Posner has explained, the Supreme Court's adoption of the "'tends to exclude'
phrase-which he regards as 'unfortunate dictum'-has 'produce[d] the paradox that the more conducive the market's
structure is to collusion without express communication, the
weaker the plaintiffs case . .

.,,,'o

Judge Posner had an opportunity to define a better approach to oligopoly pricing in HFCS.10 2 The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants conspired to fix corn syrup prices above the
normal competitive level. Existence of the conspiracy was allegedly evident from an array of circumstantial evidence, including price announcements, communications among the defendants at trade association meetings, and the defendants'
stable market shares over time. 103 Judge Posner criticized the
district court for disregarding such circumstantial evidence. He
explained that "most cases are constructed out of a tissue of
such [ambiguous] statements and other circumstantial evidence, since an outright confession will ordinarily obviate the
need for a trial."'1 4 Judge Posner argued that plaintiffs should
only be required to offer additional evidence of conspiracy under Matsushitawhen "the charge of collusive conduct" was "less
plausible." 10 5 In Matsushita, the conspiracy was implausible
because "it would mean that losses would be incurred in the
near term in exchange for the speculative possibility of more
than making them up in the uncertain and perhaps remote future ... "106 In HFCS, however, the "charge... involve[d] no
implausibility." Indeed, it was a "garden-variety price-fixing
conspiracy."' 1 7 Thus the plaintiffs should have been allowed to
reach the jury on the basis of their circumstantial evidence of a
101. David L. Meyer, The Seventh Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup Decision-Sweet for Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, Fall 2002, ANTITRUST at 67,
71 (alteration in original).
102. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655-57
(7th Cir. 2002).
103. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1017,
2001), rev'd, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
1023 (C.D. Ill.
104. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 662.
105. Id. at 661.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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price-fixing arrangement.
The HFCS approach has not yet been adopted by other
federal
courts, which continue
to apply the Monsanto/Matsushita standard in oligopoly pricing cases. 108 Few
courts have been willing to concede that plaintiffs have had sufficient evidence of a tacit agreement to surmount the Monsanto/Matsushitasummary judgment hurdle. As a result, there
is little case law defining the types of conduct that oligopolists
should avoid. This lack of authority has limited the courts' ability to deter anticompetitive behavior in concentrated markets
and may, in fact, have encouraged oligopolists to engage in tacit
collusion. The major U.S. airlines, for example, have allegedly
engaged in implicit bargaining on fares through their computer
reservation systems. 109 If the courts mean to deter such behavior, they must adopt a new approach to oligopoly conduct that
gives firms clear notice of the type of conduct that will not be
tolerated. The next Part describes a proposed approach that
would prevent the anticompetitive behavior of oligopolists
without interfering with their legitimate independent conduct.
IV. A PROPOSED MEANS OF REGULATING OLIGOPOLY
CONDUCT
A. UNIFYING THE ANALYSIS OF MONOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY
CONDUCT
The federal courts' current approach to Sherman Act violations has created a distinction between the regulation of monopoly and oligopoly conduct that has no basis in economics.
Because of differences in the language of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, the courts have tolerated a situation in which
oligopolists can collectively exercise the same market power as
a monopolist and still escape antitrust liability.1 1 0 Yet there is a
synthesis that would integrate section 1 and section 2 analysis
and allow the courts to preclude oligopolists, as well as monopolists, from engaging in conduct harmful to consumers. In all
cases, the distinction between legitimate and illegal conduct
should depend upon the defendants' purpose.

108. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
109. See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9, 10
(D.D.C. 1993) (government complaint accusing major U.S. airlines of engaging
in illegal price negotiations through their computer reservation systems).
110. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
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1. A Purpose-Based Approach to Monopolies
Neither monopolists nor oligopolists should be punished
simply for obtaining market power. Firms which obtain the
greatest share of a particular market usually have provided
consumers with the best products at the lowest possible prices.
Consider the reasons for Microsoft's domination of the market
for operating systems for personal computers. Microsoft currently controls over 90% of that market."1 Many observers argue that Microsoft gained its monopoly power because its Windows operating system was the most efficient, cost-effective
product in the market. 112 As one commentator recently explained, "no company anywhere has done more to put highquality software into more people's hands."" 3 Some commentators, in fact, argue that Windows constitutes a "natural monopoly," due to the fact that consumers prefer the ease of using a
114
single standard for all applications programs.
Although firms should be permitted to obtain monopoly or
oligopoly power through superior efficiency, their conduct
111. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
112. See, e.g., Ben Heskett & Michael Kanellos, Ballmer: MS is the American Way, CNET News.com, (last modified Dec. 5, 1997), at http://news.com
/2100-1023-206065.html.
I think what we're doing is right, lawful, moral, proper, and competitive. I might even say it's the American way. We're innovating, adding value, driving down prices, competing, serving our customers, and
we're doing it well. A lot of other companies in the United States are
benefiting because they're building on top of our platform and thriving .... I might start playing the "Star-Spangled Banner" if I went on
too long.
Id.
113. Lee Gomes, Microsoft Complains About Complacency, but Who Is at
Fault?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at BI.
114. See David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 583, 604 (1998) ("In industries
characterized by networks, even monopoly is seen by some observers as inevitable and merely an accommodation to consumer demand for a compatible
technical standard."). However, some commentators, and a few courts, have
concluded that Microsoft has misused its monopoly power to unduly perpetuate its operating system monopoly and to extend that monopoly into other
markets, such as Internet browsers. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 58-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam), affg in part, rev'g in part, 87 F.
Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that Microsoft violated section 2 by engaging in anticompetitive conduct); Maureen O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary
Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License
Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 547 (1995) (indicating that Microsoft's operating
system interface is an "essential facility" to which competitors are denied open
access).
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should be more closely regulated after they have achieved such
power. Because of their market power, oligopolists and monopolists have an enhanced ability to affect consumers, either for
good or for ill. As the Supreme Court emphasized in 1932 in
United States v. Swift & Co., "size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored ... ."115 Thus monopolists and oligopolists have a special responsibility to avoid abusive competitive practices. The courts have had no difficulty in
identifying the potential for monopolists to abuse their market
power. 116 In fact, they have held that certain conduct, perfectly
permissible for a firm with a small market share, can be illegal
when undertaken by a monopolist. The courts have, for example, precluded monopolists from engaging in tying arrangements or from denying their competitors access to certain "essential resources" controlled by the monopolists. 117
Although the courts have held monopolists to a higher
standard of behavior, they have been unable to establish a consistent dividing line between monopolists' permissible and illegal conduct.1 18 For example, even though tying and exclusive
dealing arrangements have similar competitive effects, the

115.

286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).

116. Firms have been deemed to hold monopoly power when they control
70% or more of the relevant market. See United States v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 379, 391 (1956) (inferring monopoly power from
75% market share); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G., 553 F.2d
964, 981 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that 71% to 76% market share supports inference); United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that 90% market share supports inference); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826, 902 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (observing
that for market shares between 70% and 80%, "courts have simply inferred the
existence of monopoly power without specifically examining.., control over
prices on [sic] competition").
117. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 480-86 (1992) (finding genuine issues of material fact where plaintiffs'
monopolization claim alleged that Kodak had abused its monopoly power in
the parts and services markets for Kodak photocopiers and micrographic
equipment); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
601-11 (1985) (affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs who alleged monopoly power and exclusionary conduct by the owner of three of the four downhill
skiing facilities in Aspen, Colorado); Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58-81 (affirming trial court's findings that Microsoft possessed monopoly power in the
operating system market and engaged in exclusionary conduct). See generally
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the
Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 827-33 (2000) (describing principal monopolization cases).
118. See Piraino, supra note 117, at 827-44.
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courts have treated tying arrangements more severely. 119 The
courts' inconsistent approach to monopoly conduct has confused
practitioners and business executives as to the applicable standards of conduct. 120 This author has proposed that the courts
adopt a new approach that uses a monopolist's purpose for engaging in particular conduct as the touchstone of illegality. Under the proposed approach, the courts would preclude monopolists from engaging in conduct that is contrary to their
legitimate self-interest in enhancing their efficiency and has no
rational purpose other than to perpetuate or extend their monopoly power. 12 1 Consumers are harmed in such cases, because,
instead of competing aggressively on the merits, the monopolist
is refraining from competition in order to obtain the long-term
benefits of maintaining its market power.
Consider a monopolist that controls a facility or other resource to which competitors must have access in order to compete in the relevant market. Such monopolists often try to exclude their competitors from the market by making it difficult
for them to access the essential resource.1 22 These exclusionary
actions are contrary to a monopolist's legitimate self-interest
because they deprive the monopolist of revenue it otherwise
would have received from the firms denied access to the essential facility. Thus it is reasonable for the courts to assume in
such cases that monopolists' real motive for the denial of access
is to perpetuate or extend their monopoly power. 123
119. Id. at 836.
120. See id. at 833-44.
121. Id. at 809-92.
122. Such resources are often referred to as "essential facilities." See
O'Rourke, supra note 114, at 546-47 (describing the principle of "essential facility"); Piraino, supra note 117, at 833-35; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Network Joint Ventures, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 5, 10-14 (1995)
(discussing illustrative "essential facility" cases).
123. In United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 392, 398
(1912), a group of fourteen railroads jointly owned an association that controlled the only means of access across the Mississippi River to St. Louis (two
bridges and a car ferry). No railroad could access St. Louis, then a major railroad hub, from the east without using the association's facilities. Id. at 410.
The Supreme Court concluded that the railroads illegally attempted to monopolize the local railroad transportation market when they imposed arbitrarily high charges on competitors for using the association's facilities. Id. It
would have been in the defendants' rational self-interest to maximize the
number of firms using the bridge and ferry. The railroads would have increased their revenue if they had charged a standard fee that would have allowed all their competitors to use such facilities on equal terms. Since the railroads acted against their self-interest and charged their competitors an
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Microsoft, for example, has refused to disclose information
on the interfaces to its Windows operating system, which are
necessary for competing programmers to create applications
that are compatible with Windows. 124 It has been argued that
Microsoft maintained the secrecy of such information to give its
applications programmers a head start over those developing
competing applications, as well as to preclude competing applications from evolving into an operating platform that ultimately could challenge the dominance of the Windows operating system. 125 In declining to disclose such information to
outside programmers, Microsoft was acting against its legitimate self-interest. It would be in Microsoft's best interest to
maximize the number of applications that utilize its operating
system. Such a strategy would make Windows even more useful to consumers and maximize Microsoft's immediate revenue.
When Microsoft acts against its self-interest and makes it more
difficult for competing applications to run on its system, it is
reasonable to conclude that Microsoft's real purpose was to
perpetuate its operating system monopoly. 126 Such conduct
harms consumers by denying them the choice of alternative applications. Furthermore, by protecting Microsoft's monopoly in
operating systems, the conduct reduces Microsoft's incentive to
limit price increases and to continue to innovate in operating
system products and services. Thus, under the approach proposed by this author, Microsoft's refusal to disclose information
on the Windows interfaces would be illegal on its face. 127
unreasonable fee, that effectively denied competitors access to the association's facilities, it was reasonable for the Court to conclude that their only
purpose was to preserve their monopoly power. Accordingly, the Court ordered
the association to allow all railroads to use its facilities "upon such just and
reasonable terms as shall place such applying company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and burdens" with the current owners of the association. Id. at 411.
124. See Piraino, supra note 117, at 852-53.
125. See id. at 849, 852-53; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159
F.R.D. 318, 334 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that allegations against Microsoft include charges that Microsoft "manipulates its
operating systems so competitors' applications software are inoperable or more
difficult for the consumers to utilize effectively"); Amy C. Page, Note, Microsoft: A Case Study in InternationalCompetitiveness, High Technology, and the
Future of Antitrust Law, 47 FED. CoMM. L.J. 99, 104 (1994) (describing allegations that Microsoft gives its own applications developers a more complete
version of operating system information before making such information available to other applications developers).
126. See Piraino, supra note 117, at 853.
127. See supra, Introduction.
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2. A Purpose-Based Approach to Oligopolies
A similar purpose-based approach is appropriate in oligopoly pricing cases brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Like monopolists, oligopolists have a greater ability and incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct than firms in less
concentrated markets. The courts should recognize that when
oligopolists act in concert to maintain prices at a particular
level, they are collectively exercising the same type of market
power as a monopolist. The approach proposed by this author
for monopolization cases would be no less effective in identifying the type of price-fixing arrangements among oligopolists
that are harmful to consumers. The courts should infer an illegal arrangement of tacit price collusion whenever all of the
firms in an oligopolistic market engage in identical practices
contrary to their independent self-interest.
Oligopolists obtain confidence in their rivals' commitment
to a consensus price when their rivals engage in actions that
are against their immediate self-interest and make no economic
sense other than as an invitation to join in a price-fixing arrangement. Indeed, actions by rivals against their own selfinterest can communicate their consent to a higher price level
just as clearly as a cartel's express commitment to a pricefixing arrangement. When a firm risks an immediate loss of
volume, profits, or customer goodwill in announcing a higher
price, it sends a strong signal to its rivals that it is safe for
them to observe the same price. Such rivals will then be more
likely to take the risk of acting against their own interests and
falling in line with the higher price.
Consider a market, such as steel, in which overcapacity
and declining demand would ordinarily cause prices to decline. 128 It would be against one firm's independent interest to
raise prices and risk losing volume in such a market. When a
price leader risks such action, it is telegraphing to its competitors a desire for a higher consensus price; 129 if all of the com128. See Robert Guy Matthews, Foreign Steelmakers Increase Prices, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 2002, at A2 (stating that worldwide steel consumption was approximately 20% less than production in 2001); Robert Guy Matthews, U.S.
Steel Mills Lift Key Domestic Prices, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at A2 (pointing out that as a result of overcapacity, U.S. steel prices in 2001 declined to
near twenty-year lows).
129. In certain cases, however, a price leader may have a legitimate reason
to preannounce a price increase, apart from a desire to facilitate tacit coordination. In certain industries, for example, it is customary for firms to make
such preannouncements to give their customers an opportunity to plan their
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petitors fall in line with the proposed price, their collective action contrary to their independent interests only makes sense
when viewed in the context of a unanimous tacit agreement to
a new consensus price.
The cartel-enhancing effects of actions against oligopolists'
self-interest are also evident in the retail gasoline market.
Automobile drivers need not know price changes in advance,
because they have no way of storing excess gasoline (or changing their driving habits) in anticipation of a price increase.
Thus, gasoline service stations have no legitimate independent
reason for preannouncing price changes. Indeed, preannouncements of price increases are contrary to a station's independent
interests, because they may cause consumers to immediately
begin patronizing other stations. If one gasoline station does
preannounce a price increase, the announcement will signal to
other stations the original station's intention to propose a
higher consensus price. The other stations will have more confildence in the original station's intentions because of the risk it
is taking of alienating its customers. Such a bold initiative by
the original station eliminates uncertainty as to its willingness
to participate in a tacit arrangement of price coordination. If
other stations respond by preannouncing similar price increases, they send reinforcing signals back to the original station (and to all the other stations in the area) that the original
station had, indeed, correctly judged its rivals' willingness to
observe the consensus price. The responding stations' preannouncements add credibility because these stations also are
risking their customers' goodwill in announcing higher prices.
Such signals mutually reinforce a cartel's objectives, and are no
different, from an economic standpoint, than the explicit assurances which each member of a price-fixing cartel receives from
its fellow conspirators.
Thus, the courts should infer an illegal price-fixing conspiracy when one or more firms in an oligopoly market signal
their intention to initiate a price increase in a manner contrary
to their individual self-interest and all firms in the market subsequently accept the increase by acting in a manner no less
contrary to their own interests. Under such circumstances, the
initiating firm's action should be construed as an offer to participate in a price-fixing arrangement, and the other firms' conpurchases. In such cases, a price preannouncement should not be grounds for
inferring a tacit price-fixing arrangement. See infra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
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duct in response should be deemed an acceptance of that offer.
This approach precisely identifies the "plus factors" necessary
to prove the existence of a formal conspiracy. Since the courts
could infer an illegal arrangement of tacit collusion from the
parties' course of conduct, they would be able to concentrate on
the substantive economic effect of the oligopolists' pricing behavior.
Although the courts could infer tacit collusion from circumstantial evidence, the proposed approach would still give oligopolists sufficient leeway to pursue their legitimate competitive interests. Indeed, oligopolists' conduct would only be illegal
under certain narrow circumstances. For example, in certain
industries, such as the airline industry, it is customary for
firms to advise customers ahead of price changes, so that they
can plan their purchases in advance. 130 Firms in such markets
would not be liable for preannouncing planned price increases.
If it was customary for firms to notify customers of price
changes in advance, the firms would not be acting against their
self-interest in disclosing a planned price increase, and such actions could not justify the inference of an arrangement of tacit
collusion. 131
B. PLAYING TO THE COURTS' ANALYTICAL STRENGTHS

A purpose-based approach to oligopoly conduct will play to
the federal courts' analytical strengths, by concentrating their
analysis on factors, such as the purpose and motivation for defendants' conduct, that they are well equipped to resolve. Most
often, defendants deny participating in an illegal conspiracy
and offer their own exculpatory interpretation of ambiguous
documents. 132 Since judges and juries are accustomed to determining the relative credibility of witnesses and interpreting
documents, 133 they should be able to confirm when oligopolists'
true purpose is to coordinate their conduct to maintain a supracompetitive price.
Such an approach to oligopoly conduct, however, will re130. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
131. Under the proposed approach, defendants could defeat a claim of tacit
collusion by demonstrating that they had legitimate reasons for disclosing
price information. In order to prevail, however, defendants would have to
prove that consumers benefited from the disclosure. See infra notes 185-192
and accompanying text.
132. Milne & Pace, supra note 49, at 40.
133. Id.
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quire the courts to modify the single-minded focus on economic
theory that has dominated antitrust jurisprudence for the last
twenty-five years. The Chicago School has convinced many federal judges that economic analysis should take precedence over
the traditional antitrust approach, which inquired into the motives for firms' competitive conduct. 3 4 While this emphasis on
economics has improved antitrust theory, it has seriously undermined the efficiency of judicial decision making. Under the
Chicago School approach, antitrust cases have become more
complicated and less predictable. 135 Proving economic issues
requires extensive documentary evidence and endless testimony from economists and other experts. 136 Most judges, and
nearly all juries, lack the training necessary to make economic
determinations. Although fact finders are adept at determining
"who did what, when, and why,"'137 they lack the experience
necessary to determine the significance of specific economic
conditions. 138 Economists themselves cannot agree on the eco-

134. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
135. Under the per se rule, courts had traditionally deemed certain pernicious anticompetitive conduct illegal without any consideration of the conduct's specific economic effects. The per se rule reached its peak during the
activist antitrust era of the 1960s and 1970s, at which time a conclusive presumption of illegality applied not only to horizontal territorial or customer allocations (see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967)), but also to vertical price fixing (see
Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (reaffirming
per se illegality of vertical price fixing despite finding that rule of reason
should apply to vertical nonprice restraints)), tying arrangements (see N. Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)), and even vertical nonprice restrictions imposed by suppliers on their distributors (see United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at
58). Recently, however, the courts have turned increasingly to a "rule of reason" approach, under which they will consider all of the pertinent economic
circumstances, such as the scope of the relevant market, concentration levels,
and entry conditions, before ruling on the legality of a particular restraint. See
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches
to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 693-700 (1991) (describing increased use of the rule of reason since the 1980s and the extent to which this
approach has made antitrust cases more complicated and less predictable).
136. See Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 27, 28 (1985).

137. Mark Crane, The Future Direction of Antitrust, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 3,
15 (1987).
138. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)
("Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures
and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition."); see also Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 ("Courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems .... [C]ourts are ill-equipped and ill-situated
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nomic impact of many types of business conduct. If economists
cannot effectively evaluate the market effects of particular
competitive practices, certainly judges and juries cannot be expected to do so. 139 Thus the federal courts have not been ade-

quate to the task bequeathed to them by Chicago School
economists. In their attempt to make economic judgments that
are beyond their competence, the courts have rendered a series
of confusing and inconsistent antitrust decisions. 140 As a result,
antitrust enforcement has declined as firms have found it more
difficult to plan their competitive conduct.
The limitations of the Chicago School approach are evident
in Judge Posner's decision in HFCS. Although Judge Posner
recognized that plaintiffs should be able to prove the existence
14 1
of an oligopoly pricing conspiracy by circumstantial evidence,
he stumbled in identifying the factors that should comprise the
plaintiffs' case. Judge Posner concluded that plaintiffs should
have to demonstrate the existence of certain economic conditions conducive to collusion, including concentration levels, entry characteristics, number of customers, the nature of the
relevant products, the extent of price competition, the ratio of
fixed to variable costs, and the strength of demand.142 John Lopatka has described Judge Posner's factors as "a welter of confusing, inconsistent, and ambiguous pieces of economic evidence."'14 3 Whether fact finders can even understand the effects

of such factors depends on their economic sophistication, which
for such decision making [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and evaluate the
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be
brought to bear on such decisions.") Id. at 611-12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
139. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153 (1984) ("If you assembled 12 economists
and gave them all available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited
computer budget, you would not soon (or ever) get unanimous agreement
about whether the practice promoted consumers' welfare or economic efficiency more broadly defined."). As Professor Lawrence Sullivan has concluded,
"economics does not comprehend enough and law, without extreme transformations in its own structure, cannot adequately deal with all that economics
does comprehend." LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST § 2, at 10 (1977).

140. See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
141. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662
(7th Cir. 2002) ("[M]ost [price-fixing] cases are constructed out of... circumstantial evidence, since an outright confession will ordinarily obviate the need
for a trial.").
142. Lopatka, supra note 23, at 877 (describing an approach advocated by
Judge Posner).
143. Id. at 902.
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144
varies widely from court to court.
Instead of considering factors with which they have little
expertise, the courts should concentrate on an issue with which
they deal every day: the purpose for defendants' behavior.
Rather than complex economic factors such as concentration
levels and entry characteristics, fact finders should be discerning a defendant's motives for its actions by determining the
credibility of its witnesses, its explanation for its conduct, and
the relevance and significance of memoranda, minutes, handwritten notes, e-mails and other documents that it has produced. Judges and juries are called upon daily to use such
means to determine the purpose of defendants' behavior in contract, tort, employment, and criminal disputes. 14 5 The federal
courts should recognize that a similar approach can be effective
in antitrust cases. Indeed, prior to the Chicago School's takeover of antitrust jurisprudence, the Supreme Court had concluded that a defendant's motives may reveal the economic effects of its conduct. In 1962, in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, the Court pointed out that "motive and intent play
leading roles" in antitrust litigation. 146 In 1979, the Court concluded, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, that a defendant's
purpose for particular competitive behavior "tends to show [its]
effect."'14 7 Most recently, in the 1988 case, Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., Justice Stevens, citing this
author's own conclusions, pointed out in a dissenting opinion
that "in antitrust, as in many other areas of the law, motivation
matters and fact finders are able to distinguish bad from good
48
intent."

144. Id.
145. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that the federal courts
must consider all evidence of a defendant's motive, whether it be direct or circumstantial, in employment discrimination cases. The Court held in Desert
Palace,Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), that a plaintiff alleging employment
discrimination should be allowed to reach a jury when he or she presents circumstantial evidence that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose.
146. 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
147. 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
148. 485 U.S. 717, 754 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985); McLain v.
Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The
Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4, 16-19 (1988)).
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A purpose-based approach to oligopoly pricing will not require the federal courts to abandon their economic orientation
in antitrust cases; on the contrary, it will ensure that the courts
base their decisions in oligopoly cases on substantive economic
effect. Actions by oligopolists contrary to their legitimate independent interests serve as an effective proxy for conduct harmful to consumers. Consumers benefit when oligopolists act in
their own self-interest, without any implicit assurance of their
rivals' assent to a consensus price. Firms will be more likely to
compete on the merits when they are uncertain about their
competitors' potential behavior. Even in oligopolistic markets,
firms remain subject to substantial uncertainty as to how their
rivals will behave. In the absence of pricing assurances from
their rivals, oligopolists will continue to lower their prices either to retain their current sales volume or to acquire additional volume at the expense of their rivals. For example,
neighboring gas stations may be instantly aware of their rivals'
price changes, but they will still have an incentive to engage in
occasional "price wars" to increase their share of the local market. 149 Similarly, although Boeing and Airbus are the only
firms in the world that manufacture commercial airplanes,
they still engage in substantial bidding wars in order to maintain or enhance their market position.150 Consumers, however,
are harmed when an oligopolist abandons its own self-interest
in favor of the collective interests of its rivals as a group. When
oligopolists are confident that their rivals will adhere to a cartel price, they will have little incentive to maintain lower price
levels. Oligopolists will sacrifice their legitimate self-interest in
immediate profits if they can be confident that, over the long
term, they can collectively maintain prices above the normal
competitive level. Instead of reducing their costs, enhancing
their productivity, or pursuing product innovations, firms will
maintain the competitive status quo, comfortable in the knowledge that their rivals have little reason to compete aggressively.
149. See Caleb Solomon, Free Car Wash at Service Stations Goes the Way of
the Uniformed Attendant, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1992, at B2B (stating that, in
1990, "the weak economy cut demand and caused sporadic gasoline price wars
across much of the U.S."); Unocal Corp.: Second-Quarter Net Skids as Profit
Margins Decline, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at C13 (referring to "price wars"
that "forced down gasoline prices").
150. See J. Lynn Lunsford, Boeing, Losing Ground to Airbus, Faces Key
Choice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2003, at Al ("Today, Boeing and Airbus roughly
split the market for large passenger planes .... ").
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V. ANALYZING INDEPENDENT PARALLEL CONDUCT
The proposed approach would not only deter the type of
tacit coordination among oligopolists that is harmful to consumers. It would also encourage oligopolists to engage in independent competitive conduct beneficial to consumers. The approach is consistent with antitrust's traditional recognition
that, while firms should be punished for engaging in abusive
competitive practices, they should not be deterred from competing aggressively to enhance their market power. The courts
have made it clear that it is not illegal for firms to obtain monopoly power by superior efficiency. 151 Neither should it be illegal for firms to obtain oligopoly power. 152 In most cases, oligopolists' high market shares simply reflect their success in
responding to consumers' needs. 153 Furthermore, noncompetitive behavior does not follow inevitably from high market concentration levels.1 54 Indeed, effective competition can occur in
155
oligopoly markets with as few as two participants.
151. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-40 (2d
Cir. 1945); see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-14
(1946) (endorsing Second Circuit's position in Aluminum Co.); BORK, supra

note 1, at 164 ('The framers of the Sherman Act were ... prepared to allow
any market share that was achieved by superior efficiency.").
152. As Robert Bork has pointed out, "[A]ntitrust should not interfere with
any firm size created by internal growth, and this is true whether the result is
monopoly or oligopoly." BORK, supra note 1, at 178. Efforts to expand the antitrust laws to prohibit oligopolies have been unsuccessful. In the 1960s, commentators and government regulators advocated legislation that would have
required oligopolistic firms to dissolve to reduce concentration levels. Their
proposal, adopted in the "Neal Report" to President Johnson and later introduced as legislation in Congress, required that industries that performed in a
noncompetitive fashion for an extended period could be deconcentrated without any proof of culpable conduct. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 2, at
111-18; WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42. In 1968, the DOJ staff prepared a draft divestiture complaint against the "Big Three" automobile companies, but the suit was never filed. William G. Shepherd, Antitrust Repelled,
Inefficiency Endured: Lessons of IBM and General Motors for FutureAntitrust
Policies, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 203, 225 (1994). The FTC brought a "shared monopoly" case directed at the dissolution of U.S. cereal manufacturers, but the
case was ultimately dismissed in 1981. See In re Kellogg Co., [1981] Tr. Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 63,811, at 78,358 (Jan. 17, 1981).
153. See Yale Brozen, Concentration and Structural and Market Disequilibria, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 241, 248 (1971) ("Concentrated industries are con-

centrated because that, apparently, is the efficient way to organize those industries."); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public
Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1973) (arguing that large firms in concentrated
industries "seem better able to produce at lower cost than their competitors").
154. See POSNER, supranote 100, at 47-77.
155. For example, only two firms, Boeing and Airbus, now compete in the
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Since it is not illegal for firms to obtain monopoly or oligopoly power, it should also not be illegal for them to exercise
that power independently of their rivals. Professor Turner has
pointed out that a monopolist
who becomes such or remains such by virtue of valid patents, by force
of accident, because the market has room for only one seller (which is
another way of describing "economies of scale"), by virtue of "skill,
foresight and industry," or other praiseworthy endeavor, is free from
censure and free, absent 'leverage" problems, to charge a monopoly
price .... If monopoly and monopoly pricing are not unlawful per se,
pricing, absent agreement of
neither should oligopoly and oligopoly
156
the usual sort, be unlawful per se.

Independent parallel pricing is simply a natural consequence of oligopoly power. Precluding such pricing would be
tantamount to precluding oligopolies themselves. As Judge
Posner has explained, "[O]ligopolistic interdependence... is
inherent in the structure of certain markets." 157 Thus the federal courts and antitrust commentators have been unanimous
in their conclusion that oligopolists' independent parallel con158
duct should not be illegal.
There are good economic and practical reasons for permitting conscious parallelism. 159 In pricing its products, an oligopoworldwide aircraft manufacturing market, and each has consistently offered
its customers significant price reductions in the firms' head-to-head rivalry for
new orders. See J. Lynn Lunsford & Daniel Michaels, KLM To Order Planes
From Both Boeing, Airbus, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at A2 (describing "an
all-out [pricing] war" between the two companies to obtain new airplane orders). "Evidence supplied by antitrust cases reveals that .. a large price drop
occurs when even one firm appears to challenge an established monopolist .... " BORK, supra note 1, at 181. For example, "IBM made large price reductions in its equipment when Telex entered its market." Id. at 182.
156. Turner, supra note 14, at 667-68.
157. POSNER, supra note 100, at 44.
158. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
159. Professor Turner concludes that a "rational oligopolist simply takes
one more factor into account-the reactions of his competitors to any price
change that he makes.. .. " Turner, supra note 14, at 665. "[Such] interdependent consciously parallel decisions as to basic price ...should not be held
to constitute an 'agreement."' Turner, supra note 14, at 663; see also BORK,
supra note 1, at 175-78. Judge Posner would argue, however, that even purely
parallel conduct is technically illegal under section 1. He stated in HFCS that
the Sherman Act should
encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices, that is, an agreement made without any actual communication among the parties to
the agreement. If a firm raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they do, the firm's behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising their prices. Or as the creation of a contract implied in
fact. 'Suppose a person walks into a store and takes a newspaper that
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list must take into account the likely reactions of its rivals. Because they have few competitors, oligopolists will find it easier
to anticipate how other firms will react to a price increase. An
oligopolist will, for example, be more likely to match a rival's
price increase, comfortable in the knowledge that it will not
lose business because the other competitors in the market are
likely to follow the increase. 160 An oligopolist should not be precluded from "playing the game" and making pricing decisions
by anticipating whether other firms are likely to raise their
prices. Indeed, when firms engage in consciously parallel actions, they are merely reacting in a rational way to the conduct
of their rivals. Thus, any injunction against such conduct would
be ineffective, because it would require firms to act in a manner
contrary to their rational independent interests. Firms can
avoid entering into express or tacit price-fixing arrangements.
They are perfectly capable of setting their own prices without
consulting with or signaling their intentions to their rivals.
Thus it is appropriate for the Sherman Act to preclude explicit
or tacit price-fixing arrangements. However, courts cannot order firms to stop considering marketplace realities in pricing.
their products. Courts are not capable of devising injunctions to
preclude oligopolists from making rational decisions about their
rivals' likely reactions to price changes. As Roger Blair and
David Kaserman have pointed out, "It goes without saying that
one cannot dictate myopia to the firm-a rational oligopolist
cannot be made to ignore its rivals."16' Similarly, Joseph Kattan and William Vigdor have concluded:
[I]f the same firms independently charge the same price because each
rationally recognizes that it is in its best interest to match the price
charged by its rivals, there is no avoidable conduct that the law can
punish, even if the price on which all firms settle is higher than what
is for sale there, intending to pay for it. The circumstances would create a contract implied in fact' even though there was no communication between the parties.
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir.
2002) (citation omitted).
160. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (explaining the impact
of game theory on oligopolistic markets).
161. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 204. Robert Bork has pointed out
that an injunction against oligopolists' parallel pricing could have no practical
effect, "because the firms cannot behave otherwise in such... [an oligopoly]
structure." BORK, supra note 1, at 174; see also Hay, supra note 6, at 466 ('WMajor equitable and practical concerns arise when Section 1 liability is attached
to behavior that is not plausibly avoidable."); Turner, supra note 14, at 669
("[S]uch an injunction, read literally, appears to demand such irrational behavior that full compliance would be virtually impossible.").
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would prevail in a competitive market. The law is incapable of prohibiting such behavior because it would be impossible-as well as quite
62
foolish-to require firms to behave irrationally.1

Despite their consensus as to the legality of oligopolists'
parallel pricing, the courts have been unable to agree on a
means of distinguishing between illegal tacit collusion and
permissible parallel conduct. 163 The proposed approach would
resolve the courts' difficulty in identifying instances of independent parallel pricing. The courts' analysis would be simple:
if the relevant conduct was not contrary to the defendants' legitimate self-interest, it would be permitted as a form of independent parallel behavior. When firms initiate price increases
that are in their own self-interest, they will not be sending any
special signals to their rivals of their consent to maintain a collective supracompetitive price. There are many cases in which
firms have legitimate independent reasons to initiate price increases. The firms' marginal costs, based on raw materials,
supplies, labor or other inputs, may have increased to the point
at which their profit margins become unacceptable, or enhanced demand in the market may simply have increased the
competitive price level. In such cases, other firms in the market
will retain substantial uncertainty about their competitors' future pricing intentions. The other firms will not be able to predict whether the market conditions that caused the firm to initiate the price increase (i.e., changes in input prices or demand)
will persist. Without confidence about their rivals' likely actions, firms should be just as likely to raise as to lower prices in
response to changing market conditions. Under such circumstances, all the firms in an oligopoly market would be pursuing
independent parallel conduct, and they should be permitted to
continue such activity without interference from the courts.
Consider the first example, cited in Part II.B supra, of a
town in which two neighboring gasoline stations post only their
current prices. Each station is instantly aware of changes in
the other's prices, and each immediately increases or reduces
its prices in lock-step with the other. Under the proposed approach, the courts could be certain that the gas stations had not
engaged in tacit coordination. The courts would not infer tacit

162. Kattan & Vigdor, supra note 23, at 443. As Judge Breyer has asked,
"How does one order a firm to set its prices without regard to the likely reactions of its competitors?" Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d
478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988).
163. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
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coordination among the parties merely because they followed
each other's prices. In posting their prices, the stations would
not have acted against their own self-interest, because they
would have a legitimate reason to inform customers of their
current prices. Thus each station should not conclude that its
rival was sending it an implicit signal about its willingness to
observe a consensus price. It would not be improper for one station to post a price increase and for the second station to immediately match the- higher price. The two stations should be
permitted to take each other's prices into account. The second
station's price increase would simply be a normal reaction to a
new market price. The second station's response should not
give the first station any special assurance about its long-term
commitment to a higher consensus price. Thus, in the future
the first station would be just as likely to lower as to raise its
prices. There are, indeed, frequent instances of such gasoline
"price wars" between neighboring stations.16 4 The proposed approach would recognize that the gas stations' conduct amounts
to nothing more than legitimate independent oligopoly pricing,
which should be perfectly permissible under the Sherman Act.
By contrast, consumers would have been harmed if the gas
stations had engaged in the type of tacit coordination that
would be precluded under the proposed approach. Assume that,
instead of simply posting its current prices, one station had
erected a sign stating that it would raise prices by 10% in seven
days. Such an announcement would be contrary to the station's
legitimate independent interests. The station would have no
reason to notify customers in advance of the planned price increase. Indeed, the advance announcement could harm the station by alienating consumers and encouraging them to patronize other stations, even before the price increase becomes
effective. With a preannounced price increase, the gasoline station faces a greater downside than when it initiates an immediate, unannounced price increase. The station is going out on a
limb and risking the loss of customers to the other station without knowing if the other station will go along with its price increase. Prior announcement of the price increase could, however, facilitate tacit coordination between the two stations. By
announcing a price increase in advance, the station can signal
to its rival a desire for a new consensus price. The other station
can accept the new consensus price by posting its own an-

164.

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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nouncement that it, too, will be raising prices to the same level
in seven days. Alternatively, the second station can signal its
desire for a lower consensus price by announcing that it will
only raise prices by 5% within seven days. Either type of response is against the second station's self-interest, because it is
foregoing the additional revenue (and customer goodwill) that
would result from maintaining its current lower price. The
likely effect of such price signaling is an implicit consensus on a
new higher price. After completing such bargaining on a new
price, each station should have greater confidence that its rival
will be willing to maintain the new price level until a new bargaining round occurs. As a result, each station is more likely to
avoid any price wars and to maintain a price for gasoline above
the normal competitive level.
VI. RECONCILING THE PROPOSED APPROACH WITH
PRECEDENT
A. CONSISTENCY WITH THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
CONSPIRACY

Despite the advantages of focusing on oligopolists' motive
for their conduct, few courts have been willing to infer an ille16 5
gal section 1 conspiracy from such circumstantial evidence.
There is, however, no statutory reason for making conspiracy so
difficult to prove in oligopoly pricing cases. The language of the
Sherman Act is broad enough to allow the courts to find illegal
conspiracies when oligopolists engage in mutual conduct
against their independent self-interest. No less a meeting of the
minds exists in such cases than under express cartels. 166 As
Professor Turner has explained, "there is no reason to exclude
oligopolistic behavior from the scope of the term agreement
simply because the circumstances make it possible to communicate without speech. It is not novel conspiracy doctrine to say
that agreement can be signified by action as well as by
words."' 6 7 The Supreme Court has held that oligopolists' uni165. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text (concluding that a
plaintiff must introduce direct and uncontraverted evidence of an agreement
among the defendants in order to get to a jury in a section 1 case).
166. See Hay, supra note 6, at 457 ("No less a meeting of the minds exists

when duopolists... select the identical list price and recognize the folly of
price cutting, than when twenty manufacturers... 'agree' in a hotel room to
charge an identical price.").
167. Turner, supra note 14, at 665.
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form conduct can be sufficient to prove an illegal conspiracy
under section 1.168 Indeed, actions by oligopolists against their
self-interest are a type of affirmative conduct that can be construed as implicit forms of offer and acceptance by the partici169
pating firms.
Under the proposed approach, the courts could not infer a
conspiracy unless both the initiating firm and the responding
firm had engaged in actions against their own self-interest. For
example, in the second gasoline station example in Part V, supra, one station preannounced a proposed price increase several days in advance. That station was inviting its rival's acceptance of a higher consensus price. The initiating firm's
announcement was against its self-interest, because it was taking a chance of alienating customers who had no reason to
know in advance about a price change. The station's actions
were an invitation to its neighbor to join in the higher price.
When the neighboring station responded by preannouncing
that it would raise its own prices to the suggested level, the
courts could infer that it accepted the first station's offer by its
course of conduct. 170 The responding station's price increase
would be against its own self-interest, because it would be losing the opportunity to divert business from the station initiating the proposed price increase.
B. CONSISTENCY WITH MONSANTO AND MATSUSHITA

The lower federal courts have used the Supreme Court's
168.

See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939)

(finding conspiracy among motion picture distributors who, "knowing that

concerted action was contemplated and invited,... gave their adherence to
the scheme and participated in it").
169. It is rare for firms to engage in purely parallel conduct in oligopoly
markets. In most instances, supracompetitive prices result from some communication and coordination among competitors. See POSNER, supra note 100, at
76 (stating that, in most instances, there "will have been some actual communication among the colluding firms"). The defendants will usually have "taken
specific avoidable acts that produce a consensus on the price to be charged and
mutual confidence that rivals will adhere to that price." Hay, supra note 6, at
468. Several courts have referred to these acts as "facilitating practices." Such
facilitating practices help to establish a tacit meeting of the minds among
firms in concentrated markets. They reduce "uncertainty about rivals' actions
or... diminish[ ] their incentives to deviate from a coordinated strategy." DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 5, at 95.
170. See Milne & Pace, supra note 49, at 37 ("This type of signaling can be
viewed as an offer and acceptance even in the absence of an overt commitment: the price leader makes an 'offer' to its competitors by raising its price;
the competitors accept (or not) depending on whether they follow.").
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decisions in Monsanto and Matsushita as a rationale for refusing to infer section 1 conspiracies from circumstantial evidence. 171 However, neither case should prevent the courts from
finding tacit coordination when oligopolists engage in conduct
against their independent self-interest. As Judge Posner explained in HFCS, the Court applied a strict evidentiary standard in Matsushita because the defendants did not have obvious reasons to enter into a conspiracy. 172 It was therefore more
likely than not that the defendants acted independently, and it
was appropriate to require plaintiffs to exclude the possibility
of such independent action. The defendants in Matsushita,for
example, had no apparent reason to conspire to reduce prices in
the U.S. television market, when they had virtually no prospect
of recouping their losses. 173 However, when oligopolists are accused of colluding, either expressly or tacitly, to raise prices,
they have a plausible collective interest in the success of such a
scheme, which can insure immediate higher profits for all the
participants. Thus, in oligopoly pricing cases, it is more likely
that the defendants did engage in a price-fixing conspiracy. In
such cases, plaintiffs should not have to exclude the possibility
of the defendants' independent action. They should merely have
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that oligopolists
engaged in practices contrary to their legitimate self-interest.
As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, even under Monsanto
and Matsushita, a plaintiff simply "must demonstrate that...
[a defendant] is behaving in a way that is inconsistent with
unilateral decision-making ....This means showing that the
defendant acted in a way that, but for a hypothesis of joint ac74
tion, would not be in its own interest."'
Some lower federal courts have been willing to infer illegal
oligopoly pricing conspiracies from circumstantial evidence that
defendants acted in a manner contrary to their independent
self-interest. 175 For example, in Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.,176 eight
171. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
172. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661
(7th Cir. 2002).

173.

Id.

174.

Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 726 (7th

Cir. 1986).
175.

Two commentators have concluded that "evidence tending to show

that the parties' conduct would be against their individual self-interest" has
been the most significant "plus factor" leading the courts to a finding of tacit
collusion. Kattan & Vigdor, supra note 23, at 454.
176. 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951).
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major film distributors each refused to license first-run films to
a drive-in theater. The refusal appeared suspicious, because the
theater had offered to pay.a premium for such films. The court
concluded, "[e]ach distributor has thus acted in apparent contradiction to its own self-interest. This strengthens considerably the inference of conspiracy, for the conduct of the distributors is ...

inconsistent with decisions independently arrived

at."'177 More recently, in Re/Max International v. Realty One,
Inc., the Sixth Circuit inferred an illegal section 1 conspiracy
when two real estate brokers implemented a commission arrangement that was contrary to their "independent economic
interest."'178 Instead of splitting commissions between buying
and selling agents on the customary fifty-fifty basis, the defendants adopted a policy providing for a split of seventy-thirty, in
their favor, when one of the plaintiffs agents was on the other
side of a transaction. The court pointed out that, without assurance that other real estate brokers would adhere to the onesided arrangement, no broker would want to continue the policy, because it would lose business to other brokers that treated
all agents equally. Continued adherence to the special commission arrangement only made sense if a broker had some assurance that its rivals would impose the same arrangement on
179
their customers.
It could be argued that, in oligopoly pricing cases, Monsanto and Matsushita should not prevent the courts from inferring the existence of an illegal conspiracy from circumstantial
evidence. Neither Monsanto nor Matsushita involved agreements among competitors to raise prices above the normal
competitive level. It is not certain that the Supreme Court
would require consumers harmed by supracompetitive oligopoly
pricing to introduce direct evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy.
A few lower federal courts have decided that Monsanto and
177.

Id.

178. 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999).
179. Courts have also refused to infer tacit collusion in the absence of evidence that defendants acted in a manner contrary to their legitimate selfinterest. In E. . Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 128 (2d Cir.
1984), the Second Circuit reversed the FTC's decision that various facilitating
practices, including uniform delivered pricing, most-favored-customer contracts, and advance notice of price increases, violated section 5 of the FTC Act.
The court based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that there was no evidence
of the absence of an independent legitimate business reason for the defendant's conduct. Id. at 140; see also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434,
446 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring plaintiffs to show that parallel behavior of oil
companies could not be explained by their independent business motivation).
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Matsushita should not be construed to require direct evidence
of a section 1 conspiracy in oligopoly pricing cases. In In re Petroleum Products Litigation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that,
even after Monsanto and Matsushita, a plaintiff should be allowed to reach a jury when the evidence is just as consistent
with conspiracy as with unilateral conduct:
Nor do we think that Matsushita and Monsanto can be read as authorizing a court to award summary judgment to antitrust defendants
whenever the evidence is plausibly consistent with both inference of
conspiracy and inferences of innocent conduct ....[S]uch an interpretation of Matsushita would seem to be tantamount to requiring direct evidence of conspiracy. This cannot be what the Court meant in
Matsushita. Since direct evidence will rarely be available, such a
reading would seriously undercut the effectiveness of the antitrust
laws. 180

The Ninth Circuit's approach, however, is in the minority,
as most federal courts have concluded that the defendant
should prevail when the evidence for and against a conspiracy
is equally divided.18 1
The Monsanto/Matsushita standard is particularly inappropriate for analyzing alleged conspiracies among oligopolists
to raise prices. The high standard for inferring conspiracy
should only apply when defendants do not have a182plausible moThe Court's
tive for entering into a price-fixing conspiracy.
the facts of
for
appropriate
decision in Matsushita was arguably
television
Japanese
other
the
that case because Matsushita and
reducing
for
motive
plausible
manufacturers did not have a
of reprospect
immediate
no
prices in the U.S. market with
183 By contrast, oligopolists have much to
couping their losses.
180. 906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
181. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
182. In Monsanto, the plausibility of Monsanto's motive for terminating the
price-cutting distributor was unclear. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765-68 (1983). If the complaining distributors had
threatened to discontinue their purchases from Monsanto, the company might
not have had a rational independent business reason to terminate the pricecutting distributor. The only reason for Monsanto's action could have been to
placate the complaining distributors. In such a case, a court should be willing
to infer the existence of a conspiracy between the manufacturer and the complaining distributors on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 768; see
also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among a Supplier and Complaining Distributors:A Suggested Antitrust
Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 322-25 (1982).
183. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595
(1986) ("[Pletitioners had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the
contrary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had every incentive
not to engage in the conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect
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gain from agreeing to raise prices. Unlike the defendants in
Monsanto and Matsushita, oligopolists have a strong incentive
to coordinate their conduct to increase price levels in the relevant market. By collectively maintaining prices above the competitive level, oligopolists can share in substantial monopoly
profits. It is thus much more reasonable to infer from circumstantial evidence a conspiracy among oligopolists to maintain
supracompetitive prices. Since there is no reason to be unduly
skeptical of plaintiffs' allegations of collusion in such oligopoly
pricing cases, they should not be required to meet the same
burden of proof as the plaintiffs in Monsanto and Matsushita.
VII. APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE
PRIMARY TYPES OF TACIT COLLUSION
Oligopolists need not enter into an explicit agreement in
order to become comfortable that their rivals will adhere to a
consensus price. Oligopolists can adopt various practices
against their independent self-interest that provide the same
assurances available in an express price-fixing conspiracythat is, a consensus on price and a commonly understood
18 4
means of policing and enforcing adherence to that consensus.
There are three primary practices that cement oligopolists' arrangements of tacit price coordination: (a) the disclosure of otherwise confidential pricing information, (b) the uniform adoption of marketwide standard terms of sale, and (c) adherence by
all firms in the market to a standard pricing policy contrary to
market conditions. Whenever oligopolists pursue these practices, a court should infer the existence of an illegal price-fixing
arrangement.
A. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
1.

Legitimate Disclosure

Competitors have many valid reasons for disclosing information on their prices, costs, or production levels. Indeed, in
many cases, the disclosure of such information can have a procompetitive effect.18 5 Under the proposed approach, the courts

would be to generate losses for petitioners with no corresponding gains.").
184. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 906 ("What courts can do... is to
search out and condemn practices that facilitate interdependent pricing.").
185. Thus the courts have refused to deem all information exchanges
among competitors per se illegal. See, e.g., Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
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should easily be able to determine whether oligopolists are disclosing information for legitimate independent reasons or simply to promote tacit collusion. Disclosure of pricing information
is acceptable when consumers benefit from such disclosure.
Commentators have explained that the disclosure of pricing information allows consumers to comparison shop: "Consumers
who can find out about competitor's [sic] prices, product selection, and delivery and service policies, are more likely to make
an informed choice ....This is exactly how competition is sup-

posed to work." 18 6 Customers also may need advance notice of
price changes to plan their purchases.18 7 Finally, firms may
need to disclose prices to convince their customers that they are
188
not charging discriminatorily high prices
When oligopolists have a legitimate reason to disclose pricing information to customers, they often cannot avoid the simultaneous disclosure of the information to their rivals. Indeed, when consumers are widely dispersed, as in retail
markets, suppliers often cannot disclose pricing information
other than in a broad public manner. Thus competitors will
naturally obtain access to such information, and that fact
should not make the information disclosure illegal.
The airline industry is a good example of a market in
which firms are justified in publicly preannouncing price
changes. The airlines post future fares on the Internet, where
they are available to customers and competitors alike.1 8 9 The
carriers need to disclose planned price changes, so that consumers can plan their bookings for future travel. It would be
Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2002) ("[A]ntitrust
law permits ...discussions [among competitors] even when they relate to pricing, because the 'dissemination of price information is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman Act."') (quoting United States v. Citizens & So. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975)); see also Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452,
464 (1st Cir. 1949) ("[T]he public interest is served by the gathering and dissemination, in the widest possible manner, of information ... [on] production ... cost and prices ....").
186. Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 433.
187. See, e.g., Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
971 F.2d 37, 54 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that price "announcements served an
important purpose in the industry... [because customers needed] advance
notice of price increases").
188. In the Petroleum Products case, prices were supposedly posted to assure customers that they were not being overcharged. In re Petroleum Products, 906 F.2d 432, 449 (9th Cir. 1990).
189. See Brad Dorfman, Four Airlines Plan Joint Travel Site, Reuters, at
http://www.e-gateway.netlinfoarealnews.cfm?nid=208 (Nov. 10, 1999) (describing four competing airlines' joint travel website).
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impossible to keep such information from rival carriers. As a
result, the airlines will have more information on their competitors' pricing plans, and they will take each other's future
prices into account in planning their own pricing policies. However, no carrier should be liable when its rivals "independently
and as a matter of business expediency" decide to follow its
price increase. 190 In such a case, the airlines are simply making
their own independent evaluation of their self-interest, based
on the best information available to them. As Professor Turner
has explained, prohibiting oligopolists such as the airlines from
taking their competitors' conduct into account "would 'demand
such irrational behavior that full compliance would be virtually
impossible."' 191
The airlines' preannouncement of future price changes can
be distinguished from the impermissible price signaling described in the second gasoline station example in Part V, supra.
In that example, two neighboring gasoline stations each erected
signs announcing future price increases. The stations had no
legitimate reason to pre-announce their price increases, because their customers could not purchase gasoline in advance.
The amount of gasoline which any consumer can purchase is
limited, of course, by the size of his or her gasoline tank. The
airlines' customers, however, plan their travel in advance, so
they benefit from prior notice of price changes. The airlines are
not acting against their self-interest in disclosing advance pricing information to consumers, but are simply pursuing rational
independent business practices. Without the added assurance
provided by rivals' actions against their self-interest, individual
airlines are not likely to obtain the confidence necessary to observe a higher consensus price for an extended period. Indeed,
proposed increases in airline fares are unsuccessful when they
are not supported by market conditions. Consider the communications that occurred among the major airlines over a weekend in early 2002. On Friday, February 14, 2002, Continental
Airlines announced higher prices for leisure and business
travel. Seven other carriers raised prices in step with Continental Airlines, but Northwest Airlines refused to change its
prices. By Sunday, February 16, 2002, all the airlines had
190. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 2, at 221. See also Kattan & Vigdor,
supra note 23, at 452 ("[E]ach firm rationally made its own independent
evaluation of its self-interest and followed it knowing, of course, that its own
actions would be taken into account by rivals in making their own decisions.").
191. Turner, supra note 14, at 669.
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rolled back their prices to match Northwest. 192
2. Improper Disclosure
Certain types of information exchanges among oligopolists
can facilitate tacit collusion. Advances in technology, such as
the Internet, have made it easier for competitors to exchange
information.1 93 Thus information exchange in oligopoly markets
should now be an even greater concern to antitrust regulators.

194

Information exchanges may allow firms to peg the level of
a new consensus price. Information about a firm's past prices
"can be a pointer toward a new optimal price level for the industry."'195 Information on future prices can be even more effective in facilitating collusion, for such information allows oligopolists to signal their intention as to a new consensus price,
thereby reducing the uncertainty of other firms contemplating
their own participation in a tacit pricing arrangement.196
George Hay has concluded that the communication of proposed

192. Scott McCartney & Susan Carey, Airlines' Move To Raise Fares Falls
Apart as Northwest Balks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2003, at D5. Price signaling in
the airline industry is just as likely to result in lower as in higher prices. A
good example of this phenomenon occurred in January, 2000. Trans World Airlines (TWA), then the eighth-largest U.S. airline, took the lead by announcing
lower prices. TWA's lower prices were quickly matched by the other domestic
carriers, resulting in better prices for all the airlines' customers. Major U.S.
Airlines Cut Fares to Fill Post-Holiday Vacancies, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 3623411.
193. See Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 423 ("Businesses are often able, at
low cost, to make information available to consumers and investors and, either
advertently or inadvertently, to competitors as well.").
194. Courts have inferred price-fixing agreements when competitors have
communicated to each other the prices that they will quote in particular bargaining situations, or the methods they will use to determine such prices.
Turner, supra note 14, at 670-72.
195. Hay, supra note 6, at 454. Some courts have found agreements among
competitors to exchange past pricing information to be per se illegal, because
of their potential to stabilize prices. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp.
of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (stating that agreement among sellers is per
se illegal under the Sherman Act when the exchange results in a restraint of
trade).
196. See FTC v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp. 526, 527 (D.D.C. 1994) (describing charges in an FTC complaint against three leading manufacturers of infant formula, for disclosing information that reduced uncertainty as to the
consensus price). Professor Turner has defined an unlawful agreement to include "prior communication of .. the price that will be quoted in a particular
uncertain bargaining situation .. "Turner, supra note 14, at 672.
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197
future prices "may be nearly as efficient as direct collusion."
Communications as to future prices can be specific ("we plan to
raise prices across-the-board by 2% next month"), or general
("we will follow any price increase less than 5% by competitors"), or vague ("we believe that price increases on the order of
3% are appropriate"). 198 The more specific the information, the
more it reduces uncertainty for other firms, and the greater
should be the inference of tacit collusion. 199
Information exchanges may also make price-fixing conspiracies more durable by allowing participants to detect deviations from a consensus price. Disclosure of information on
firms' past prices may allow oligopolists to discover whether a
rival is undercutting a consensus price. 20 0 Data on sales volumes could reveal an unusual increase in a particular firm's
sales due to price-cutting. Oligopolists could use such informa20 1
tion to monitor their rivals' adherence to a consensus price.
The proposed approach would allow the courts to distinguish proper from illegitimate disclosures of information. The
courts would simply preclude oligopolists from any disclosures
that lacked a legitimate competitive rationale. In many markets, consumers do not need to plan their purchases in advance
and thus do not need to receive information on possible future
price increases. Furthermore, in any market in which firms
discriminate in price among their customers, it will not be in
their best interest to disclose price changes to all customers.
Firms selling industrial products to original equipment manu-

197. Hay, supra note 6, at 463.
supra note 5, at 435.
198. Carlton et al.,
199. Some courts have used the announcement of future price increases,
followed by uniform adherence to a particular price, as evidence of a pricefixing conspiracy. See, e.g., In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d
432, 446 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[T]here was essentially no purpose for publicly announcing ... [future prices] ... other than to facilitate either interdependent
or plainly collusive price coordination."). Preannouncements of other types of
anticipated future competitive conduct may also facilitate oligopolists' arrangements of tacit collusion. Information on future production plans might
facilitate a tacit agreement to reduce output during periods of excess capacity.
A steel-company might, for example, predict a glut of steel during the next
twelve months. Certain commentators have concluded that a court should infer tacit collusion if this prediction were "followed by a number of industry
participants taking factory 'downtime"' to reduce the excess capacity. See
Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 424.
200. Hay, supra note 6, at 451 ("For example, supermarkets can learn reasonably quickly when another supermarket has reduced the price of one of its
products.").
201. See id. at 454.
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facturers (OEMs), for example, may not want their other customers to know about a volume discount granted to a particularly large OEM. 20 2 If such firms act against their individual

self-interest and adopt a policy of publicizing all price changes,
a court could conclude that they were only disclosing the information to signal the proposed terms of a tacit price-fixing ar20 3
rangement to their rivals.
The courts may also infer tacit collusion when oligopolists
publicly disclose information that has no value to consumers.
Fact finders may infer that such disclosure was designed to signal an implicit consensus price. In Petroleum Products, for example, the court found an illegal price-fixing conspiracy among
oil companies, noting that the defendants announced wholesale
prices and dealer discounts in which consumers had no interest. The court concluded that "there was essentially no purpose
for publicly announcing [wholesale prices] and dealer discount
information other than to facilitate either interdependent or
204
plainly collusive price coordination."
The major U.S. airlines have a legitimate reason to preannounce planned price changes to the public. 205 In certain
cases, however, the airlines have disclosed other information
that had little, if any, utility to customers and only appeared
designed to facilitate tacit price coordination. In United States

202. Similarly, shipping companies have no reason to publicize the rates
charged to their customers. European antitrust authorities are investigating
two ocean-shipping companies for possibly colluding to fix prices by disclosing

to each other otherwise confidential information on bid prices. See Bandler,
supra note 64. Stigler recognized that "collusion will always be more effective"
when secret bids are publicly disclosed. Stigler, supra note 55, at 48.

203. The FTC has attempted to attack price signaling as an illegal facilitating practice under section 5 of the FTC Act. In three complaints (each of which
was later settled), the FTC alleged that certain "invitations-to-collude" constituted unfair methods of competition. In each of those cases, the defendants
had solicited their rivals to engage in a price-fixing conspiracy by signaling
their intentions to price at a particular level. See YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., [19931997 Transfer Binder] Tr. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,355, at 23,030 (July 1, 1993)
(consent order) (alleging request that competitor stop offering free equipment
to customers); AE Clevite, Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Tr. Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 23,354, at 23,029 (June 8, 1993) (consent order) (alleging statement to
competitor that its low prices were "ruining the marketplace"); Quality Trailer
Prods. Corp., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Tr. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,246, at
22,932 (Nov. 5, 1992) (consent order) (alleging statement to competitor that its
prices were too low).
204. In re Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 446.
205. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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v. Airline Tariff PublishingCo., 20 6 the DOJ accused the airlines
of engaging in illegal price negotiations through their jointly
owned computer reservation system. The airlines published
proposed new fares prior to their effective dates. The effective
dates on the reservation system were "constantly changing"
and bore little relationship to the actual dates on which new
fares were finally implemented. 20 7 Thus they could not "be relied upon by consumers in making airline ticket purchasing decisions." 208 The Government alleged that the proposed effective
dates for fare changes were used by the airlines "primarily to
signal prices and negotiate with other airlines."

209

In addition,

the airlines used "footnote designators" that conveyed information other than the terms of sale, such as links between the
routes on which airlines were planning to change fares. 210 The
Government claimed that the carriers' purpose for these designators was to communicate to each other planned changes in
fares. 21 1 The Government and the airlines entered into a consent decree that prohibited the carriers from continuing to use
the fare information and footnote designators in their computer
2 12
reservation system.
If the Government had challenged the airlines' conduct under the proposed approach, a fact finder likely would have concluded that they had engaged in tacit price collusion. Since consumers did not benefit from the information on the reservation
system, the airlines had no legitimate purpose for disclosing
their proprietary fare information. It was against the airlines'
self-interest to list proposed effective dates for fare changes
that were so rarely observed in practice. The airlines could expect to lose credibility with their customers by preannouncing
conditional dates subject to constant change. Such disclosures,
as actions against the airlines' individual self-interest, gave
each carrier greater assurance that its rivals would abide by
the consensus price. Because all the carriers agreed to participate in identical disclosures contrary to their own interests, a
206. 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1993).
207. Id. at 13.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 13 n.7.
210. "[S]ome of the 'notes' accompanying the fare changes and appearing on
the bulletin board were alleged to contain messages of the following sort: 'I,
airline X, will lower my fare at your hubs, airline Y, unless you rescind your
fare cuts at my hubs."' Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 437.
211. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. at 12.
212. Id. at 9, 12-14.

2004]

REGULATING OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT

61

court could reasonably have inferred that the carriers had tacitly agreed to a price-fixing arrangement.
Secret exchanges of pricing information among oligopolists
raise the most serious antitrust issues.2 13 If the relevant information is not publicly disclosed, a defendant cannot argue consumer welfare as a rationale for the information exchange.
With access to the Internet and other electronic means of communication, it is more difficult today for firms to restrict information exchanges to their competitors. When they do so, there
should be a strong presumption of an anticompetitive purpose. 214 In most cases, it is not in firms' legitimate self-interest
to disclose confidential pricing information directly to their rivals. As Susan DeSanti and Ernest Nagata have explained,
A firm presumably would not release competitively sensitive information to a competitor unless it expected to gain something in return.
Thus, unless there is a procompetitive explanation for the communication, in concentrated markets a logical inference is that the communication was intended to facilitate coordinated behavior ....215

In a few instances, however, oligopolists may have a legitimate reason to communicate pricing information directly to
their rivals. Several commentators have pointed out that
"[s]uch sharing can be procompetitive-it can make possible
'benchmarking' or the adoption of 'best practices'... and
thereby sharing of information can lower cost and price." 216 In-

formation sharing among competitors often, in fact, promotes
the type of innovation in products and services that is beneficial to consumers. For example, because of their proximity in
Silicon Valley, employees of computer chip manufacturers are
213. The FTC has given two reasons why the public disclosure of pricing,
cost, and production information is less of an antitrust concern. "First, there
are more likely to be efficiency justifications for public statements. Second, the
public nature of the communication may cast doubt on any collusive purpose
since the communication is likely to draw antitrust scrutiny." DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 5, at 111. In Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d
452, 462-63 (1st Cir. 1949), the defendants' public posting of prices at a central location helped to negate the inference of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.
214. See Tag Mfrs., 174 F.2d at 462 (noting that secret communications
among competitors suggest "the inference that the agreement is inspired by
some unlawful purpose").
215. DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 5, at 96 n.11.
216. Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 434. Judge Posner argues that firms'
need for information about their competitors is just as critical as consumers'
need for pricing information. Richard A. Posner, Information and Antitrust:
Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1194
(1979).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:9

able to engage in a constant exchange of technical information
with each other. 217 In most cases, however, firms can accomplish their benchmarking objectives while avoiding the disclosure of information on proposed future price increases. Firms
can limit their disclosure of price information to past transactions, thus keeping their future marketing plans confidential.
Furthermore, in most cases, firms should be able to aggregate
the relevant data before it is distributed, making it difficult to
match information with specific competitors. 218 Oligopolists
thus usually have no legitimate reason to disclose their specific
future prices directly to their competitors. If all the firms in the
market make available to each other confidential information
on future prices that is not otherwise disclosed to customers, a
court could reasonably infer that such consistent actions by all
the parties contrary to their legitimate self-interest supports
the inference of an illegal price-fixing arrangement.
B. THE ADOPTION OF UNIFORM TERMS OF SALE CONTRARY TO
FIRMS' SELF-INTEREST
It is in oligopolists' independent self-interest to negotiate
their own terms of sale with their customers, using their
unique skills, leverage, and relationships to their maximum
advantage. When oligopolists abandon such an individual approach and submit to terms of sale that are standard for an entire market, courts may reasonably conclude that their only
purpose was to facilitate a tacit price-fixing agreement. A group
of producers may, for example, submit identical bids to a customer when their legitimate interest is in negotiating individual transactions that take full advantage of their unique bargaining position. In FTC v. Cement Institute, the Supreme
Court inferred a price-fixing agreement when firms bid
$3.286854 per barrel on an order of 6000 barrels. 2 19 In such
cases, competitors would normally be expected to submit divergent quotes, and it would strain credulity to conclude that such
220
identical bids were not the result of a tacit agreement.

217.

See David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust,

62 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 470 (1994) ("Information exchange and cooperative
relationships of various kinds lie at the heart of this tremendously innovative
assemblage of physical and human assets.").
218. Carlton et al., supra note 5, at 434.
219. 333 U.S. 683, 713 & n.15 (1948); see also BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra
note 2, at 215 (describing conclusion of the case).
220. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 850. Such an agreement, however,
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By adopting marketwide terms of sale that are contrary to
individual firms' self-interest, oligopolists can ease the process
of reaching an understanding on price and of enforcing adherence to a consensus price, For example, under a "delivered pricing" system, firms charge a standard amount for shipping
without regard to a customer's location. A variant of this form
of pricing is "basing-point" pricing, in which firms agree to
charge customers the same delivered price, regardless of their
distance from the factory. 22 1 Thus all customers pay the same
amount for freight, despite the fact that their facilities are geographically dispersed. It is against most suppliers' self-interest
to agree to a delivered or basing-point price arrangement, because they sacrifice their cost advantage in dealing with customers located nearer to their plants than to their competitors'
facilities.
The first firm that agrees to engage in delivered or basingpoint pricing sends a strong signal to its rivals of its desire for
an industry-wide consensus price. The firm's commitment to
the consensus price will be evident from its agreement to sacrifice its cost advantage in dealing with nearby customers. The
initiating firm's rivals should conclude that it was only willing
to give up that advantage because it anticipated greater returns from the maintenance of a higher industry-wide price.
Furthermore, by entering into a delivered or basing-point pricing arrangement, the initiating firm gives its competitors
greater visibility to its total net prices. Under normal circumstances, each customer would pay a different delivered price
from a particular supplier. "Thus, even if one firm knows its rival's mill price, it may not be able to match the delivered price
to a given customer unless it knows the relevant shipping costs

should usually not be inferred when rivals simply charge the same price for a
standardized commodity. Such conduct amounts to nothing more than conscious parallelism. See In re Petroleum Prods. Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("[P]ermitting an inference of conspiracy from the parallel pricing
evidence alone would result in an anticompetitive dislocation by distorting independent pricing decisions."); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d
363, 369 (8th Cir. 1949) ("We are clear that mere uniformity of prices in the
sale of a standardized commodity ... is not in itself evidence of a violation of
the Sherman Anti-Trust [sic] Act.").
221. See C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 496 (9th
Cir. 1952) ("Under the pricing system used by defendants, a consumer in Los
Angeles paid the same price for a fire extinguisher regardless of whether the
purchase is made from a dealer or manufacturer located in New York, New
Jersey, or Los Angeles, California.").

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:9

from the rival's plant to that customer." 222 A delivered or basing-point pricing system gives each firm notice of the total price
paid by all customers, allowing firms to match each other's
prices in all cases. 223 Hay has explained that "[i]n this respect,
use of a delivered price formula accomplishes what could be accomplished in hotel-room meetings." 224
The ultimate adoption by all firms in an oligopolistic market of delivered or basing-point pricing arrangements thus
should be sufficient evidence of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy. The first firm to adopt such an arrangement is inviting its
rivals to join in a common means of facilitating adherence to a
consensus price. When all firms adopt identical delivered or
basing-point pricing systems, such actions contrary to their individual self-interest should be conclusive evidence of their acceptance of the initial firm's invitation to engage in a tacit
price-fixing arrangement. 225
An industry-wide agreement to adopt "most-favoredcustomer" clauses may also facilitate tacit coordination. Such
clauses guarantee that a buyer will receive the lowest price
granted by its supplier to any other customer. 226 In certain
cases, such a provision may be retroactive, requiring a supplier
to provide a rebate to a buyer if another customer is offered a
lower price. 2 27 It is not in individual firms' interests to enter
into most-favored-customer clauses, unless such provisions are
demanded by their customers. Without receiving some consideration from a customer, a firm should have no legitimate reason to guarantee that the customer will receive the lowest price
granted to any other buyer. Most-favored-customer clauses reduce the advantages of price-cutting because a firm must offer
222. Hay, supra note 6, at 462.
223. See generally Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th
Cir. 1948), affd, 336 U.S. 959 (1949) (finding that basing-point formula allowed sellers to quote identical delivered prices); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,
637 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A]ny delivered pricing system can become
a potent tool for assuring that competitors are able to match prices and avoid
the rigors of price competition.").
224. Hay, supra note 6, at 462.
225. Historically, some firms have challenged the industry-wide adoption of
agreements to use delivered prices. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S.
683, 714 (1948) (describing how economic conditions during the Depression
forced some firms to abandon delivered prices). Such efforts, however, have
been unsuccessful and the renegade firms have been faced with the choice of
using the prevalent pricing system or going out of business. See id.
226. Hay, supra note 6, at 455.
227. Id.
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the lower price to pre-existing customers. For sellers subject to
such clauses, the increased volume resulting from a lower price
will be offset by the requirement to lower their prices acrossthe-board.
When an oligopolist obligates itself to a most-favoredcustomer clause, it can signal its rivals that it favors a particular consensus price. As Hay has pointed out, such an oligopolist
may persuade "its rivals that it will not initiate a price cut,"
thereby "establishing the mutual confidence necessary to
launch a period of noncompetitive pricing."228 Oligopolists'

most-favored-customer contracts are particularly suspect when
they do not receive substantial consideration from their customers (such as a commitment to increase purchases) in return
for an agreement to provide the customers with the lowest
available prices. When one firm initiates such a clause, it encourages its rivals to take a similar risk in order to cement a
tacit arrangement of price coordination; if all or most of the
firms in the market respond to the initial firm's invitation
without receiving some compensating consideration from their
customers, the courts need inquire no further before inferring a
tacit price-fixing arrangement.
C. UNIFORM ADHERENCE TO PRICING LEVELS CONTRARY TO
MARKET CONDITIONS

The courts should infer an illegal arrangement of tacit
price coordination whenever all the firms in an oligopolistic
market adhere to uniform pricing levels contrary to those that
would be expected under prevailing market conditions. The inference of tacit coordination should be particularly strong when
a large number of sellers increases prices in tandem despite a
decline in demand or increase in capacity in the relevant market. If such sellers were acting in their own self-interest, they
would respond to a decline in demand or increase in capacity by
keeping their prices low in order to increase their sales. It
would be against their interest to pass up an opportunity to
enhance their profits by offering discounts during recessionary
periods. If, instead, they collectively raise prices, "it is virtually
inconceivable" that there was "no prior actual agreement." 229 In
228.
229.

Id. at 456.
Turner, supra note 14, at 660. "Any economist worthy of the name

would immediately brand this price behavior as noncompetitive." Id. at 661;

see also C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.
1952) ("Price increases which occur in times of surplus, or when the natural
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such cases, a court could infer that the firms were only willing
to maintain a higher price because they had some assurance
that their rivals would follow suit.230
Firms have the greatest incentive to engage in tacit coordination to increase prices above the normal competitive level
during recessionary periods, when prices are depressed and
profits are slim. One firm may invite its rivals to participate in
an arrangement of tacit coordination by announcing a substantial price increase, despite the current overcapacity in a particular market. Because price increases during periods of expanding capacity or declining demand are clearly contrary to a
firm's rational economic interest, the other firms in the market
should gain substantial confidence in the initiating firm's commitment to a higher consensus price. When, despite recessionary economic conditions, all the firms in the market follow suit
and increase their prices to the new level, a court should infer
an illegal arrangement of tacit coordination. 23 1
Consider the conduct of the U.S. automobile manufacturers
in past recessions. Before imports became a substantial factor,
the "Big Three" automobile companies (General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler) controlled most U.S. automobile production. 232 In
this oligopolistic market, it was relatively easy for the Big
expectation would be a general market decline, must be viewed with suspicion.").
230. In RelMax International v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th
Cir. 1999), the court inferred a section 1 conspiracy when real estate brokers
adhered to a new commission policy that would have caused the brokers to
lose business, had they no assurance that their competitors would also observe
the policy.
231. See T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, Testing for Collusion
During Periods of Input Supply Disruptions: The Case of Allocations, 45
ANTITRUST BULL. 213, 218 (2000) (illustrating that a rigid price structure that
persists for a long period of time, covering periods of prosperity as well as recession, may also be evidence of tacit collusion); see also C-O-Two Fire Equip.
Co., 197 F.2d at 497 (finding an illegal agreement when prices in the fire extinguisher market remained substantially the same from 1932 to 1947). Similarly, tacit collusion may be evident when prices suddenly become more stable
than they have been in past years. Lopatka, supra note 23, at 859. In finding
tacit collusion in HFCS, Judge Posner referred to evidence that the defendants' market shares had remained stable despite growth in the output of the
relevant product. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d
651, 660 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[The output of HFCS grew during this period and
one might expect that growth to have brought about changes in market
shares; for it would be unlikely that all the sellers had the same ability to exploit the new sales opportunities opened up by the growing demand.").
232. Even with imports, the Big Three currently hold 64% of the U.S.
automobile market. See supra note 9.
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Three to tacitly coordinate their conduct to maintain higher
prices, even when domestic demand declined significantly. As a
recent article in the Wall Street Journal pointed out, "In past
recessions, the Big Three auto companies tended to act in lockstep, offering some generous rebates but for the most part hold233
ing prices steady and simply absorbing drops in volume."

Under the proposed approach, a court could have concluded
that the Big Three's pricing was contrary to each of the manufacturer's independent self-interest. If one of the companies had
lowered its prices, it could have gained additional volume and
market share at its rivals' expense. 234 Each of the Big Three
may have been willing to sacrifice its immediate self-interest
and forego additional volume in order to obtain the long-term
benefits of a higher market price. Indeed, there is no plausible
scenario, in the face of declining demand, under which the
automobile companies would have been willing to disregard
their individual interests and maintain higher prices, unless
they had confidence that all firms in the market would have
been willing to observe a similar price. In such a case, the Big
Three's conduct would have made sense only if they had received assurance that their rivals would act similarly, and on
that basis, a court could have concluded that the automobile
manufacturers had engaged in an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.
Oligopolists' simultaneous adoption of lower prices poses a
more difficult problem. The Supreme Court observed in Matsushita that fact finders must be careful not to infer unlawful conduct merely from consistent price-cutting among rivals, because the courts might "chill the very conduct the antitrust
laws are designed to protect." 235 The Supreme Court concluded
more recently in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. that "discouraging a price cut and forcing firms to
maintain supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers of
the benefits of lower prices in the interim, does not constitute

233. Sarah Ellison, In Lean Times, Big Companies Make a Grab for Market
Share, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at Al.
234. In fact, during the most recent recession, in 2002-2003, General Motors was more willing to pursue its own self-interest, by "relentlessly ...
court[ing] consumers... with generous rebates and cheap financing, in a
brash effort to grab [market] share from Ford Motor Co. and DaimlerChrysler
AG." Id. at A6.
235. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986).
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sound antitrust policy." 236 However, coordinated price-cutting

by most of the firms in the relevant market can be a means of
disciplining price-cutters and ultimately forcing them to observe a higher consensus price. 237 Thus, in certain cases, rivals'
practice of lowering prices in tandem should be sufficient to infer tacit collusion. 238 To avoid deterring procompetitive conduct,
the courts should make such an inference only when oligopolists have clearly acted against their self-interest in implementing price reductions. An inference of illegality is appropriate
when a reduction of prices among all the firms in the relevant
market occurs under one of the following circumstances: (1) rising demand in the market that would otherwise support a price
increase, (2) capacity reductions that would typically lead to
higher prices, or (3) a drastic departure from past pricing practices unexplained by a decline in demand or increase in capacity. 239

VIII. REMEDIES TO PREVENT TACIT COLLUSION
The proposed approach would encourage the courts to develop effective remedies against tacit collusion. The courts have
had little difficulty in devising remedies to preclude explicit
price-fixing agreements. Treble damages and injunctions have
proved to be a powerful deterrent against such conduct. 240 The
courts have not, however, been effective in identifying and precluding oligopolists' tacit coordination. The proposed approach
236. 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
237. See Hay, supra note 6, at 454 ("[T]he leader has the ability and willingness to discipline price cutters by substantially lowering prices for a period.").
238. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 710 (1948) (basing inference of
agreement on circumstantial evidence of "collective methods" used to assure
compliance with pricing formula, including boycotts and retaliatory pricecutting against recalcitrants).
239. Tacit collusion may be evident when all or most of the sellers in the
relevant market engage in substantially identical conduct that constitutes a
marked departure from prior practices. Assuming that most defendants' prior
practices were legitimate, courts may rightfully inquire into defendants' motives for implementing a sudden and coordinated change in such practices. In
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court noted
that all the film distributors simultaneously adopted a new practice of refusing to license first-run films to a suburban Baltimore theater. 306 U.S. 200,
223 (1939). The Court concluded that such a dramatic shift in conduct could
not have been the result of independent competitive behavior. Id.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Bjorn Sjaastad, 6 Tr. Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,103, at 45,604 (Oct. 22, 2003) (describing agreement by ocean-shipping
company to pay $42.5 million fine for participating in price-fixing cartel).

2004]

REGULATING OLIGOPOLY CONDUCT

69

would improve the courts' performance in oligopoly pricing
cases by focusing their attention on specific facilitating practices contrary to defendants' self-interest. It should be relatively easy for the courts to fashion injunctions prohibiting such
practices. The courts could, for example, prohibit oligopolists
from observing certain industry-wide standard terms of sale or
from predisclosing proposed price changes when customers
have no need for such information. 241 In many cases, the courts
will be able to infer tacit price collusion when firms collectively
increase prices during periods of excess capacity or declining
demand. 242 Under such circumstances, the courts can prevent
further collusion by a simple injunction prohibiting future
price-fixing agreements. 243 Knowing that they could face harsh
antitrust penalties for noncompliance, including the possibility
of treble damages, oligopolists are more likely to charge competitive prices after the entry of injunctions and to avoid following a price leader in lockstep when economic circumstances dictate a different pricing approach.
The proposed approach would save the courts from becoming unduly involved in economic remedies that are beyond their
competence. No court would be able to infer an illegal conspiracy when oligopolists pursue independent pricing policies that
are in their legitimate self-interest. Since parallel pricing
would be perfectly acceptable, the courts would have no reason
to require defendants to act irrationally and price their products without considering their rivals' likely reactions. Neither
would they have to require defendants to observe particular
price levels. Federal courts are particularly ill-suited to engage
in price regulation, 244 and the proposed approach would insure
that the courts confined themselves to precluding particular
241.

For example, an injunction against an industry-wide delivered pricing

system could "simply forbid sellers from quoting delivered prices only, and
compel them to give buyers as an alternative a bona fide f.o.b. price." Turner,
supra note 14, at 676. Similarly, the courts could enjoin defendants from entering into most-favored-customer contracts, unless they received some compensating consideration from buyers.
242. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
243. See Lopatka, supra note 23, at 885 ("[A] simple injunction can be entered prohibiting future price fixing, which would serve as the predicate for
the imposition of severe penalties in the event of subsequent collusion.").
244. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. See also Lopatka, supra note 23, at 906 (pointing out that, if courts prohibited parallel pricing,

"section 1 remedies, even if they would not compel defendants to act irrationally, would nevertheless require the unacceptable regulators").
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conduct that they had already determined was contrary to defendants' independent self-interest.
Injunctions against specific facilitating practices should
terminate a substantial number of price-fixing conspiracies
that otherwise might have continued for a substantial period of
time. Such injunctions should also deter oligopolists from attempting new arrangements of tacit collusion that might have
gone undetected. With clearer guidance on prohibited conduct,
firms are more likely to report to the authorities their rivals'
attempts to solicit their participation in an arrangement of
tacit collusion, thus reducing the cost of antitrust enforcement.
At the same time, by making clear oligopolists' right to engage
in parallel pricing practices, the proposed approach would encourage firms in concentrated markets to continue to engage in
efficient means of competition beneficial to consumers.
IX. CONCLUSION
After more than 100 years, the courts have yet to devise an
effective means of determining when oligopolists enter into illegal arrangements of tacit collusion under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The lower federal courts' interpretation of recent
Supreme Court decisions has only made it more difficult for
them to regulate oligopolists' tacit collusion. The new approach
proposed in this Article would clarify the dividing line between
illegal and permissible oligopoly conduct without violating Supreme Court precedent. The approach requires the courts to determine the purpose and motivation for defendants' conduct, a
task they are well qualified to perform. Judges and juries are
required every day to determine the reasons for defendants'
behavior in contract, tort, employment, and criminal cases.
There is no reason why they cannot do so in antitrust cases as
well. Indeed, a purpose-based inquiry is particularly appropriate in oligopoly pricing cases. Game theory teaches that oligopolists can harm consumers when they cooperate to pursue
their collective rather than their individual competitive interests. By concentrating on whether oligopolists have acted in a
manner contrary to their legitimate independent interests, the
courts can determine when firms have engaged in the type of
tacit coordination harmful to consumers. This approach would
conserve judicial resources, clarify the applicable legal standards, and encourage firms in concentrated markets to compete
on the merits rather than through their collective market
power.

